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REQUIRED JOINDER OF CLAIMS* 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE AMERICAN AND THE GERMAN LAW 
Dieter L. Hoegent 
THIS comparative study is confined to the situation of one claimant against one claimee. The principles which will be 
considered seem to be rather well settled both in the American and 
the German law. The fact, however, that besides many a common 
result we shall find fundamental differences in the pertinent basic 
concepts of the American and German systems makes the discus-
sion worthwhile. It may, at least, promote a reconsideration of the 
propriety of those concepts. 
The American law of joinder of claims in its present stage, like 
the law of joinder of parties, is the product of a long historical de-
velopment. The term "product," to be sure, may be somewhat 
misleading, for it is not just a complete body of rules once drawn 
and then loosed from its history; that history cannot be forgotten 
even where the law has been codified. Thence it comes that the 
subject still has to be examined in four different connections: at 
common law, in equity, under the codes, and under the federal 
rules. And not infrequently the more modern law of joinder of 
claims, despite its effort to favor the viewpoint of procedural con-
venience, is to some extent burdened by this very history. This is 
not the case with the German law of joinder of claims. The perti-
nent basic provision of the code is in favor of free joinder of 
claims so unmistakably that it hardly ever admits of any doubt 
which might be predicated on history. So it may be said that the 
German provision is really a complete "product" in a sense not true 
of the American law. 
Before going into what may be called required joinder of 
claims it will be helpful to take a brief look at joinder of claims 
in general, or, more precisely, permissive joinder of claims (one 
claimant against one claimee), for this is, systematically and as 
already indicated by the terms, at least one of_ the major back-
grounds against which required joinder must be considered. 
What is meant by required joinder of claims is, in the American 
law, found also and even more frequently under the denomina-
tion "splitting a cause of action," or "splitting an 'entire' claim." 
• Submitted to the Faculty of the University of Michigan Law School in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the LL.M. degree. 
This article is being published in two instalments.-Ed. 
t Jur. D. 1952, Heidelberg; LL.M. in Comparative Law, 1957, University of Michigan; 
Gerichtsassessor am Landgericht, Mannheim.-Ed. 
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This points to another and even more important background of 
the doctrine: res judicata. Where problems of this sort arise in 
the German law they greatly resemble those of the American law; 
yet they may not be said to have a place in the "foreground" of 
the whole joinder doctrine. This noteworthy fact is significant 
enough to indicate that the relationship between rule and excep-
tion with respect to required joinder of claims must be much 
different in American and German law. Indeed, it is. As intimated, 
however, the problems and considerations to be passed upon when 
required joinder does apply are much alike. They are essentially 
threefold: (I) Does required joinder of claims mean that the plain-
tiff is bound to join the respective claims or else be thrown out 
of court by a judgment not even going to the merits? (2) Or is the 
enforcement of the plaintiff's "duty" confined to the operation 
against him of the doctrine of res judicata in case he does not join? 
If so, to what extent? If not so, what else enforces the requirement 
of joinder? (3) What rationale underlies the concept of required 
joinder of claims? 
I 
A BRIEF SURVEY OF JOINDER OF 
CLAIMS (PERMISSIVE J OINDER) 
As already stated the American law of permissive joinder must 
be looked at in four different connections: at common law, in 
equity, under the codes, and under the federal rules. Inasmuch 
as the federal rules are the prevailing law for all federal courts 
there is one uniform law all over the United States in this sense 
and to this extent. So far as the state courts are concerned, however, 
the distinctions among common law, equity and the code provi-
sions are important. The German regulations (without reference 
to their particular contents) are, in a sense, comparable to the 
federal rules in that the Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) of 1879, en-
acted by the former Reichstag, created a uniform civil procedure 
for all Germany. Although the German courts, here in question, 
are courts of the Laender (states)1 they all have to proceed accord-
ing to the Zivilprozessordnung, regardless of what kind of law the 
case may involve.2 
1 With the exception of the Bundesgerichtshof, the Supreme Court for civil and 
criminal cases, which is a federal court. Cf. Art. 92 Grundgesetz (Basic Law), present 
constitution for West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany). 
2 This is due to the fact that civil procedure was, under the constitutions of 1871 
and 1919, and still is under the Grundgesetz, a matter of concurrent federal and state 
legislation. Cf. art. 74(1) Grundgesetz; and once the federal legislature had made use 
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At Common Law. The old common law for various reasons 
condemned a multiplicity of issues.3 As a joinder of claims ordi-
narily presents at least two issues, it is not surprising that at the 
outset it was not permitted. The surprising thing is rather that 
the common law later came to recognize joinder of claims (causes 
of action) to an extent, namely, that as many claims could be 
joined as could be comprised in one writ.4 This meant that the 
plaintiff could join in one writ as many claims as he had of the 
same form of action. This change of the old common law was 
accomplished by the practice of the chancery clerks, who often 
allowed a claim to be enlarged in point of sums and quantities 
and thereby gave authority for joining any number of causes of 
action of the same form. The ancient rule against multiple issues, 
though not abolished, was no longer interpreted so as to reduce 
all matters in controversy to only one issue, but to prevent more 
than one issue being raised with respect to one claim.5 The only 
exceptions to the rule that the claims joined must be of the same 
form of action were the joinder of debt and detinue and of case 
and trover. 
In Equity. While the common law disfavored a multiplicity 
of issues, it was a multiplicity of suits which was condemned in 
equity. The aim was to settle an entire controversy between the 
plaintiff and the defendant in one proceeding.6 There was, it is 
true, some difference of opinion among the courts as to whether 
joinder of claims should be permitted with entire freedom, sub-
ject only to the discretion of the court, or whether it was necessary 
that the causes joined be related by a common question of law or 
fact.7 Yet, this disagreement seems not to have been as considerable 
in substance as it may appear to have been. The common principle 
governing both views was the rule against "multifariousness." That 
is to say that even those courts which advocated free joinder as a 
general principle reserved the right of separating unconnected 
of its power it thereby excluded the states from doing so. Cf. art. 72 (1), 31 Grundgesett. 
The Zivilprozessordnung of 1879 as amended several times since then has been upheld 
as prevailing federal law of the Federal Republic of Germany by the provision of art. 
125 Grundgesetz. 
8 See Blume, "A Rational Theory for Joinder of Causes of Action and Defences, and 
for the Use of Counterclaims," 26 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1927). 
41d. at 4-5. 
5 Id. at 4-7. 
6 Cf. Cr.Alut, HANDBOOK OF THE L\w OF CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., 437 (1947). 
7 See Blume, "A Rational Theory for Joinder of Causes of Action and Defences, and 
for the Use of Counterclaims," 26 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1 at 10-11 (1927); BLUME, AMERICAN 
CmL PROCEDURE 3!19-340 (1955). 
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causes where they could not conveniently and properly be liti-
gated together.8 At any rate the two rules, against a multiplicity 
of suits and against multifariousness, brought about notable prog-
ress in equity as compared to the common law. They p:iade more 
sense in that they put the main emphasis upon what seems to be 
the proper criterion in this context, viz., procedural convenience. 
The rule against multiplicity avoided the narrowness of the com-
mon law rule which required the same form of action to be avail-
able for all claims joined. The rule condemning multifariousness, 
on the other hand, guarded against the inappropriate breadth 
which was also a characteristic feature of the common law rule, in 
the sense, namely, that it did not place · any restriction on the 
number or nature of the causes which might be joined as long as 
all came under the same form of action.9 
Under the Codes. More than half of the states have adopted 
codes of civil procedure.10 The first was New York which, with 
its code of 1848, started the procedural reform movement in 
America. The New York code abolished the old common law 
forms of action and established one form of civil action instead. 
Legal and equitable claims could be joined in one action. But the 
New York code, while it abolished the old forms of action, did 
not provide for a free joinder of claims. It set forth seven classes 
of situations in which joinder might be had.11 The codifiers still 
felt that there should be some formal tests for restricting joinder 
of causes.12 This reminds one of the common law rule of joinder, 
despite the abolition of the old forms of action. In 1852 another 
class of joinder was added by amendment which was much more 
general in nature and was intended to help accomplish a combi-
nation of the common law and equity practices. By this provision 
joinder was allowed of causes of action "arising out of the same 
transaction or transactions connected with the same subject of 
action."13 Causes of action joined under any of these clauses must 
affect all the parties to the action, and not require different places 
s See Blume, "A Rational Theory for Joinder of Causes of Action and Defences, a!J.d 
for the Use of Counterclaims/' 26 MICH. L. REv. I at IO, and n. 28 quoting from Bank 
v. Starkey, 268 Ill. 22 (1915); BLUME, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 340 (1955), quoting 
from Newland v. Rogers, 3 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 432 (1848). 
: 9 Blume, "A Rational Theory for Joinder of Causes of Action and Defences, and for 
the Use of Counterclaims," 26 MICH. L. REv. I at 9 (1927). 
10 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., 25 (1947). 
11 For example, actions arising out of contract; actions for injury to the person; 
actions for injury to property, etc. See CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., 438, 441, 450 et 
seq. (1947). 
12 Cf. Sunderland, "Joinder of Actions,'' 18 MICH. L. REV. 571 at 579 (1920). 
13 N.Y. Laws (1852) c. 392, §167. 
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of trial. The other code states have substantially copied the New 
York provisions. In some states the causes joined must be con-
sistent.14 Thus, the characteristic features of the codes are the 
specified classes on one hand, and the general clause on the other. 
There are two tests: (I) Does the case come within one of the 
classes? (2) If not, does it come within the general clause? 
A satisfactory combination of the common law and equity prac-
tices was not really accomplished by the codes. The main reason 
for this fact seems to be that the large discretion which had been 
vested in the courts of chancery was taken away and replaced by 
a general clause whose interpretation caused and still causes great 
difficulties. The terms "transaction" and-even more-"subject of 
action" have still not been defined satisfactorily. The courts are 
far from agreeing on the meaning of the clause15 and, depending 
upon its interpretation, it is entirely possible that the maximum 
scope of an action is narrower under the codes than it was under 
the equity rules. 
New York, the leader in code development, amended its pro-
vision on joinder of claims in 1935. Now it practically allows free 
joinder of claims; and the court may, upon application, order 
severance or separate trials where it thinks advisable.16 Some other 
states have also removed the restrictions on joinder of claims.17 
Under the Federal Rules. Rule 18 (a) of the Federal Rules of 
1938 greatly resembles the New York provision of 1935. It author-
izes the plaintiff to join in one action "as many claims either legal 
or equitable or both as he may have against an opposing party," 
subject merely to the power of the court to order separate trials 
"in furtherance of convenience and to avoid prejudice." [Rule 
42 (b)]. The federal rules thus favor the modern concepts of free 
joinder and procedural convenience.18 
Under the German Law. Prior to the enactment of the 
Zivilprozessordnung of 1879, the uniform federal code, Germany, 
too, had what was called "common law procedure," leaving aside 
the codes of a few states. The common law procedure was a mix-
14 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., 448 et seq. (1947). 
15 Blume, "A Rational Theory for Joinder of Causes of Action and Defences, and 
for the Use of Counterclaims," 26 MICH. L. REv. I at 20 (1927); MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE 
OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HlsTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 112 (1952). 
16 N.Y. Civil Practice Act, §258, as amended by N.Y. Laws (1935) c. 339. See CLARK, 
CoDE PLEADING, 2d ed., 440 (1947). 
17 See CLARK, CoDE PLEADING, 2d ed., 443 (1947). For a general survey of the joinder 
rules, see also BROWN, DIGEST OF PROCEDURAL STATUTES AND COURT RULES 100 et seq. (1954) 
18 Cf. 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 2d ed., §18.04 (1) (1955). 
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ture. It developed from elements of the Romano-canonical pro-
cedure carried into Germany by the reception of the Romanic 
law in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and from surviving 
elements of the Germanic procedure which antedated the re-
ception.19 As to joinder of claims the common law procedure was 
already very modem. A plurality of claims in favor of one plaintiff 
against the same defendant could be joined in• one action provided 
that all came within the jurisdiction of the court and could be 
enforced by the same form of procedure.20 
This principle was taken over almost literally into the Zivil-
prozessordnung whose present section 26021 provides: 
"Several claims of the plaintiff against the same defendant, 
even though they may be based upon different occurrences, 
may be joined in one action, provided that they all come 
within the jurisdiction of the trial court and can be enforced 
by the same form of procedure." 
If the jurisdiction of the court is merely dependent upon the 
amount of a claim, the aggregate of all claims joined is determina-
tive.22 The last requirement of section 260 refers to some special 
forms of procedure such as, to pick out three examples, the negoti-
able instrument procedure,23 proceedings in matrimonial causes, 
and proceedings in status causes.24 These proceedings pursue 
special purposes and are, therefore, governed by special principles 
and provisions. For this reason the legislature did not want 
causes of these kinds to be joined with causes which have to be 
enforced in the ordinary proceeding.25 Within the ordinary pro-
ceeding, however, free joinder of claims is allowed, subject merely 
to the jurisdictional restriction referred to. Even wholly unre-
19 See ENGELMANN and others, A HISTORY oF CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE, translated 
and edited by R. W. Millar, p. 507 (1927). 
20 Id. at 548. 
21 Originally ZPO, §232. 
22 See ZPO, §5. 
23 ZPO, §592 et seq. If plaintiff chooses this procedure he has to prove all facts which 
constitute his claim, by documents. If he can do so he gets a preliminary judgment 
regardless of defendant's defenses which the latter cannot prove by documents, as well. 
It is intended to be a very expeditious procedure. In the preliminary judgment (which 
is executable and appealable) the judge reserves to the defendant the right to prove his 
defenses not provable by documents in an ordinary proceeding immediately following. 
24 ZPO, §606 et seq. and §640 et seq., respectively. Because of the public interest 
involved in such cases the proceedings are preponderantly governed by the principle of 
judicial investigation rather than that of party-presentation. 
25 For similar reasons there are also a few other dispersed provisions prohibiting 
joinder which, however, may be left aside here. 
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lated claims may be joined.26 It thus appears that the German 
law of joinder of claims, with respect to the ordinary proceedings 
at least, is very much the same as the law under the federal rules, 
the New York code as amended in 1935, and in those other states 
which have removed the old restrictions. 
Two procedural problems closely connected with the joinder 
doctrine are consolidation and severance. 
Consolidation and severance are important complements to 
the law of joinder. This is true although they were not always 
so regarded and some codes and statutes still keep them separated 
from the joinder provisions. 
According to modern conceptions the purpose of the court's 
power to consolidate several actions is to realize in its sound dis-
cretion the desirability of a single proceeding where the actions 
could have been "consolidated" by the plaintiff, i.e., where he 
could have joined the claims pending in several actions, and, 
moreover, to accord some margin of discretion to the court even 
beyond the scope of joinder granted to the plaintiff. Thus, by 
making the question one of trial rather than of pleading consolida-
tion effectuates the joinder rules without making them compul-
sory, and, at the same time, completes them by imparting an ad-
ditional flexibility. 
Modern severance serves a corresponding purpose. It affords 
the possibility of separate trials or proceedings where several 
claims could be and were pleaded in one action but, by virtue 
of the particular circumstances of the case, cannot conveniently 
be tried together, and therefore should not be tried together. The 
states most modern in view of what has been said above are Cali-
fornia and New York. They allow consolidation whenever it can 
be done without prejudice to a substantial right, even where the 
actions are pending in different courts.27 The statutes of most 
of the other states restrict consolidation to cases where the second 
claims are pending in the same court and the plaintiff could have 
joined t:b,em originally and make consolidation dependent upon 
application.28 The federal rules29 and the rules of some states 
allow consolidation where there is a common question of law or 
fact.30 
26 As a matter of pleading, at least. As to the court's power to sever claims joined, 
see below. 
27 See CLARK, CoDE PLEADING, 2d ed., 491, and note 195 (1947). 
28 Id. at 491, note 193. 
29 Rule 42 (a). 
30 See Cl.ARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., 491, 492 (1947). 
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The consolidation provision (§147) of the German Zivilpro-
zessordnung stands somewhat in between. Consolidation is al-
lowed whenever several actions between the same or different 
parties are pending in the same court which could have been 
joined in one action or are legally related.31 Thus, on one hand, 
the provision does not restrict consolidation to cases where it has 
been applied for and the plaintiff or plaintiffs could have joined 
the actions to be consolidated; on the other hand, however, it 
does not permit consolidation of actions pending in different 
courts. 
As to severance the provisions of most code states and of the 
federal rules on one side and of the Zivilprozessordnung on the 
other side are very much alike. · Most codes provide for severance 
where it can be done without prejudice to a substantial right of 
the parties.32 Federal rule 42 (b) allows separate trials "in fur-
therance of convenience and to avoid prejudice." The German 
provision, ZPO, section 145 (1), confines itself to the simple state-
ment that the court may order severance of several claims joined 
in one action. The court exercises its discretion according to 
procedural convenience and the rights of the parties.33 The Zivil-
prozessordnung (§ 150) also expressly provides that the court in its 
discretion may vacate a prior order of consolidation or severance. 
Looking back from this modern state of development to the 
history of the American common law and equity it is interesting 
to observe that at common law already, as arbitrary as it may have 
been in its joinde:r rule, consolidation was allowed whenever the 
plaintiff could have joined the respective causes of action in one 
suit; whereas in equity, where the joinder rules were much 
broader, there seems to have been some conflict as to whether such 
power was vested in the court.34 Severance, on the other hand, 
was not developed in common law, but was employed in equity 
under the rule against multifariousness.35 
31 For a similar provision of Arkansas, cf. CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., 491 (1947). 
32 Id at 492. For the New York provision see note 16 above and the te..xt theretofore. 
33 Only in case of misjoinder the severance is mandatory. In the German code both 
the terms of consolidation and severance are employed in the meaning of true consolida-
tion and severance. Consolidation and severance for trial are not admissible. Cf. STEIN-
JoNAS-SCHOENKE, KOMMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG, 17th ed., §145 V, §147 ill (1953). 
34 See CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., 490, note 191 (1947). 
35 See note 8 above and text theretofore. 
1957] REQUIRED J OINDER OF CLAIMS 
II 
REQUIRED J OINDER OF CLAIMS 
A. Required ]oinder of Claims, Commonly Termed tn 
American Law the Rule Against Splitting an 
Entire Cause of Action, or Claim 
807 
I. Comparative Illustration. Let us start the discussion by 
introducing a few basic cases to illustrate-roughly at first-the 
situation in the American law and the German law. One Ameri-
can case is enough for the present purposes; three German cases 
will sketch the prevailing German solutions. 
In Buchanan v. General Motors Corp.36 the plaintiff entered 
into an agreement with the defendant according to which the 
plaintiff licensed the defendant to make and sell ice trays for 
mechanical refrigerators under certain Letters Patent owned by 
the plaintiff. In consideration thereof the defendant was to pay 
royalties to the plaintiff. Under this agreement the defendant 
made and sold two kinds of ice trays, "single trays" and "double 
trays," i.e., trays with one grid each and trays with two grids each. 
The plaintiff brought two successive suits against the defendant. 
The first suit concerned the single trays. The defendant had 
paid royalties for part of them only, contending that the other 
part of the single trays made and sold by it were of a different 
type which did not come within the terms of the above-mentioned 
agreement. The plaintiff sued for the royalties allegedly due on 
this part of the trays. His action was dismissed and became res 
judicata. 
Subsequently the plaintiff brought a second suit concerning 
the double trays. He alleged that they consisted of two devices on 
which two unit royalties should have been paid in accordance with 
said agreement but that the defendant had paid a single royalty 
only. The differen~e he claimed. Upon the defendant's objec-
tion the court dismissed the second suit on the ground that it was 
barred by the judgment rendered in the former action. The 
court pointed out that the plaintiff should have included this 
claim in the prior action because it was based on a breach of the 
36 (S.D. N.Y. 1946) 64 F. Supp. 16. As previously intimated, required joinder of claims 
has been a familiar feature of the common law, equity, code and federal practices, even 
though under the old common law it may not have been applied quite as extensively as 
under modern practice. See CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., 473 et seq. (1947). It does not 
make much difference, therefore, when and by what court the case we have picked out has 
been decided. 
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same contract and because the breach, as the plaintiff had learned 
before the trial of the first action, had occurred prior to the com-
mencement of the first suit. 
In the first of the illustrative German cases37 the plaintiff 
entered into a contract with the defendant under which the plain-
tiff was obligated to remove a certain considerable quantity of 
earth and to procure and keep ready the necessary tools. The 
defendant, in consideration thereof, was to pay a certain money 
compensation to the plaintiff. The plaintiff procured the tools, 
had them brought to the place whe:i:e the work was to be per-
formed, and removed about half of the quantity of earth fixed in 
the contract. The defendant, then, intentionally prevented the 
plaintiff from doing the remaining work and fully performing 
the contract. As a consequence the tools were scattered about 
without being used for some considerable time. They thereby 
became almost worthless to the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought 
two actions for damages against the defendant. 
The first action was for damages sustained by the depreciation 
of the equipment as a consequence of defendant's breach of the 
contract. The plaintiff claimed some 12,000 marks. The court 
granted him some 6,000 marks and denied the rest. 
In a subsequent second action the plaintiff claimed compensa-
tion for the damages sustained by defendant's breach of the con-
tract, except those recovered in the former proceeding. The plain-
tiff demanded payment of the profits he had lost by having been 
prevented from fully performing the contract, i.e., the difference 
between the contractually agreed price for the services and his 
net cost in case of performance. 
The defendant relied upon res judicata of the former judg-
ment. The Reichsgericht, however, held that a different claim 
within the meaning of ZPO, section 322 (1)38 was presented in 
the second suit which was not barred by the former judgment. 
The partial denial of the plaintiff's claim in the first judgment 
related only to that particular claim for depreciation of the tools, 
but did not preclude the present claim for loss of profits. 
Thus, although the two claims arose out of breach of the same 
contract and both had occurred prior to the commencement of 
37 JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT (hereinafter J.W.) 1896, p. 691, ,r1s. The case is typical 
still today. It was decided in the Reichsgericht, the German supreme court for civil and 
criminal cases prior to 1945. If not othenvise noted all German cases in the following 
text, taken from any report or periodical, were decided in the Reichsgericht. 
38 This provision will extensively be discussed later. 
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the first suit, the court allowed two successive actions to enforce 
them. The difference from the American case is obvious. There, 
the second action was held barred by the prior adjudication in 
spite of the fact that the two claims were predicated upon two 
distinct breaches of the contract whereas in the German case two 
actions were held admissible although the common basis for both 
of them was but one breach of the same contract. If the German 
case had to be adjudicated in America there would, accordingly, 
even be an argument a fortiori to decide it the same way as the 
American case reported, and the same would be true as to the 
American case under the German jurisdiction. This makes the 
difference especially clear! There are, however, some situations 
in which the German law departs from the ruling of the case just 
considered. The following two cases will serve as illustrations.80 
The defendant by certain conduct has violated plaintiff's patent 
A and patent B. In a first action the plaintiff sues him for damages 
suffered by the infringement of patent A. After the adjudication 
of this case the plaintiff brings a second damage action for the 
interference with his patent B. No matter whether the plaintiff 
won or lost on his first action (patent A) his second action (patent 
B) is barred by the former judgment. This is the rule set forth 
in section 54 of the German Patentgesetz of May 5, 1936.40 
The defendant owes the plaintiff 500 marks. The plaintiff 
sues the defendant for 10 marks as part of the 500. There is 
evidence to the effect that the plaintiff has planned to bring fifty 
different law suits against the defendant each for 10 marks.41 
Plaintiff's action for the 10 marks has to be dismissed without 
prejudice. A plaintiff is not permitted to split a claim into multiple 
claims where it is apparent that the only purpose of the split is 
to produce injury to the defendant. Such an action is not even 
admitted to be considered on its merits. 
The cases considered indicate and roughly mark out the range 
of the following discussion. What we can state at this point is 
this: when the American law talks in terms of required joinder 
of claims it does not mean to say that the plaintiff is bound to join 
the respective claims in one action or else be thrown out of court 
-that he cannot get a judgment on the merits as to part of them. 
39 They are not decided cases but hypothetical ones according to the prevailing law. 
40 This provision and similar ones contained in some other statutes, will later be con-
sidered more closely. 
41 For a similar case see HELLWIG, SYSTEM DES DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESSREqITS, Part I, 
p. 462 (1912). 
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Such a rule applies within the field of joinder of parties when 
necessary or indispensable parties, respectively, are not joined as 
plaintiffs or defendants, as the case may be, but not to a pure 
joinder of claims, i.e., to the cases of "splitting a cause of action." 
Otherwise the first action in cases like the ice-tray case could not 
even have been maintained and adjudicated on the merits. Rather, 
the requirement of joinder of claims, whenever it applies, is en-
forced by indirection, namely by barring a second action for the 
other claims after judgment in the first action has been had. 
Accordingly, the objection to splitting is one to be made in the 
second action. 
Insofar as the German law has condemned splitting at all, as 
indicated by the second and third German cases above, there may 
be observed this distinction: the second case (patent case) in effect 
goes along the same line as the American law; the desired joinder 
of claims is enforced-and thus made required-by the same indi-
rection, the same legal device of clothing a judgment in the first 
action with a bar effect. The ruling of the third case, on the 
other hand, implies an application of the concept of required 
joinder of claims in its literal sense: the plaintiff must join, or he 
loses for not having properly commenced his action which, there-
fore, cannot be considered on its merits.42 A similar situation is 
presented where the plaintiff, for the purpose of circumventing 
the superior court's jurisdiction, splits his claim among several 
contemporaneous suits each of which separately fits into the in-
ferior court's j~risdiction. This, too, will be discussed later. 
2. Scope of the Rule of Required Joinder of Claims in Amer-
ican Law. The cases treated under this topic43 are of two kinds: 
(1) where the plaintiff really has but one claim44 in the meaning of 
the substantive law, and (2) where he has or may fairly be said to 
have more than one claim according to the substantive law. 
One might at first assume that only the cases of the second 
kind could furnish proper material in the context of required 
joinder of claims. This seems to be a postulate of linguistic logic. 
This conclusion, however, would disregard the historical develop-
ment and would, therefore, be false in substance, at least. "Re-
42 The judgment is without prejudice. To what extent the plaintiff should have joined 
the other "claims" of his "entire" 500-mark claim will be discussed below in the proper 
context. 
43 The discussion is, as already indicated at the beginning of the introduction, confined 
to the situation of "one claimant against one claimee." 
44 Take, for example, a situation like that of the last of the three German cases above, 
where the plaintiff has but one single claim for 500 marks, maybe for selling a used 
motorcycle. 
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quired joinder of claims" is a modern term. The rule has come 
down through Anglo-American legal history as one against split-
ting a claim (an "entire" claim), a cause of action (an "entire" 
cause of action), and most courts and probably the majority of 
the text writers still talk in these terms. This makes it quite clear 
that the cases of but one claim were the original cases, and that, 
historically, the inclusion of cases of the second kind, with more 
than one claim, need to be justified. It has been by virtue of a 
definite tendency to widen the limits of the terms "single, entire 
claim" and "single, entire cause of action," that this inclusion has 
occurred.45 Especially in consideration of this fact the term "re-
quired joinder of claims" is probably more appropriate. It should 
help avoid what is sometimes considered doing violence to the 
terms "claim" and "cause of action" (what is an "entire" claim 
or an "entire" cause of action really?) and is likely at the same 
time to encourage progress by stressing the viewpoint of pro-
cedural convenience. On the other hand, it can just as well be 
applied in regard to the "true" cases of but one claim. One 
single substantive-law claim may constitute a plurality of "pro-
cedural claims," of good minimum causes of action in the meaning 
of the law of procedure, when split among several law suits. And 
these claims, in turn, you may-as a matter of linguistic as well as 
legal logic-fairly require to be joined. This shows that "required 
joinder of. claims" is a procedurally colored term. 
Treating both kinds of cases under that topic not only is in 
accord with history and logic, but also should bring about some 
further distinction in thinking between substantive law and law 
of procedure. These statements are not intended to mean that 
an attempt will be made in this study to base the doctrine against 
splitting on a new foundation and to trace the possible dogmatic 
and practical consequences of such an undertaking. That is not 
the object of this comparative study. The foregoing statements 
are intended only as a terminological explanation of "required 
joinder of claims" as used in this study. This term has been 
given preference over the orthodox term of "splitting a cause of 
action," not in order to develop new theories different from what 
is generally held to be the law under the latter but for another 
reason. 
The definition of the terms "cause of action" or "entire cause 
of action" or "entire claim" has bothered the courts and writers. 
There has been strong disagreement as to their meaning, and a 
411 Cf. Cl.ARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., 474 (1947). 
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great number of law review articles have been written on the 
subject.46 Judge Clark, considering the various definitions of 
cause of action, lays stress on three general views.47 There is one 
treating cause of action as identical with "right of action," a right 
against the courts to prosecute an action with effect. Under the 
second view it is argued that cause of action refers to a group of 
facts, but is limited and restricted by the resulting legal right 
which is to be enforced. The third general view is similar to the 
second inasmuch as it also considers cause of action as refer-
ring to a group of facts, but it is different from the second view 
with respect to the limitation of that group. The particular refer-
ence to the resulting legal right or rights has been rejected. The 
group of facts is said to be limited to a single occurrence or affair, 
as seen through the eyes of a lay onlooker. The cause of action 
would be "such an aggregate of operative facts as will give rise to 
at least one right of action, but it is not limited to a single right 
(if it is ever possible to isolate one such right from others)."48 
This study will not make an attempt to reconcile these different 
views or even to decide which one of them deserves preference-a 
task which a great number of most capable American lawyers 
(including judges) have not :yet been able to accomplish. And in 
actuality, despite the strong disagreement which has raged as to 
the meaning of cause of action or "entire" cause of action, a great 
majority of courts and a great many of the other authorities largely 
agree in point of results so far as the cases within the doctrine 
against splitting a cause of action are concerned-somewhat sur-
prising as this may be. Accordingly, the struggle about the cause 
of action does not in fact hinder a general "restatement" of the 
largely prevailing law on this subject. As, however, this might be 
thought inconsistent, it may be better to talk in terms of reg_uired 
joinder of claims. The term "claim" in this connection is intended 
to mean a procedural minimum unit of judicial action.49 As op-
posed to the maximum unit considered above, the minimum unit 
46 See, among others, Wilson, "Writs vs. Rights: An Unended Contest," 18 MICH. L. R.Ev. 
255 (1920); Gavit, "The Joinder of Actions in Indiana," 7 IND. L.J. 470 (1932); McCaskill, 
"The Struggle for Simplicity in Pleading," Iu.. B.A. REP. 164 (1933); Gavit, "A 'Pragmatic 
Definition' of the 'Cause of Action'?" 82 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 129 (1933); Arnold "The Code 
'Cause of Action' Clarified by U.S. Supreme Court," 19 A.B.A.J. 215 (1933); Clark, "The 
Cause of Action," 82 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 354 (1934); Gavit, "The Cause of Action-A Reply," 
82 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 695 (1934). 
47 Cr.ARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., 129 (1947). 
48 This is Judge Clark's own view. Id. at 137. 
49 As federal rule 8 (a) may be said to employ the term, without attempting to deter-
mine a maximum unit. 
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has not been the object of such heated debate. The extent of the 
requirement to join such procedural minimum units will be de-
scribed on the basis of the generally prevailing authorities. 
The Restatement of the Law of Judgments presents the fol-
lowing rule: 
"Where a judgment is rendered, whether in favor of the 
plaintiff or of the defendant, which precludes the plaintiff 
from thereafter maintaining an action upon the original 
cause of action, he cannot maintain an action upon any part 
of the original cause of action, although that part of the 
cause of action was not litigated in the original action .... "50 
This obviously means to state the rule in terms of splitting a 
single cause of action.51 Without particular regard to terminology, 
what is the substance of the doctrine? 
(a) Within the field of contracts. In Buchanan v. General 
Motors Corp.52 the court based its holding in the second action 
on the settled rule "that all breaches of a contract prior to the 
commencement of a suit for such breaches are considered as a 
single cause of action, and if a party brings a suit for a part only 
of an entire indivisible demand and such action is disposed of 
on the merits, it may not subsequently sue for recovery on the 
demands omitted .... " 
The surprising thing about this rule is this: Concededly, 
each one of the several breaches upon its respective occurrence 
50 JUDGMENTS llEsTATEMENT 242-243 (1942). 
51 Even on the ground of the orthodox terminology, it may be doubted whether this 
is the most fortunate wording. What is meant by "original cause of action?" Is it the 
''entire" cause of action? If so, the statement seems to treat as a prerequisite of the rule 
(" ••• which precludes •• .'') what in reality is its context: it is the rule itself that the 
plaintiff after a judgment on the merits is precluded from maintaining an action upon 
the entire cause of action. In other words, the result to be proved seems to have been 
made a condition of that result, the result itself an element of its proof. Or does "orig-
inal cause of action" mean the matter (really) in controversy, the subject matter of the 
original action? If so, then, its second usage in the passage quoted would not accomplish 
what it is supposed to: for the plaintiff is not only precluded from maintaining a sub-
sequent action upon the subject matter of the original suit (this alone would be nothing 
special in the law of res judicata), but from bringing a further action upon the "entire" 
cause of action. This is, of course, meant to be indicated by the passage following 
"although," but not as clear as it may seem to be. Assumed as it is, that "original cause 
of action" means matter in controversy, subject matter of the original action, it is hard 
to conceive how any part of that very matter should not have been litigated after all. It 
seems to be a matter of course, even more than that, a logical necessity that it was, and, 
hence, is embraced by the res judicata effect anyway. 
This ambiguity, however, can easily be removed by substituting "which goes to the 
merits of the plaintiff's case" for the "which" clause as it stands, or the phrase "any part 
of the entire cause of action" for "any part of the original cause of action.'' This would 
be a remedy in the sense of the old terminology, at least. 
52 (S.D. N.Y. 1946) 64 F. Supp. 16 at 18. 
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constitutes a distinct cause of action, a distinct claim. The plain-
tiff might bring a separate suit for each one of them as long as 
the next breach had not yet occurred. Still, as soon as multiple 
breaches of a contract have accumulated without having been 
sued upon separately, they suddenly become one single (entire!) 
cause of action, and the formerly separate causes of action take 
on the character of "parts" of this single, entire cause of action. 
The latter, then, is deemed indivisible, so that all "parts" must 
be united in one action in order to be preserved. 
The same rule applies, for example, in the case of a promis-
sory note payable in installments. Each installment when it falls 
due constitutes a distinct cause of action which might be sued 
upon as such. But all installments which have fallen due prior to 
the commencement of an action form one single claim, one en-
tire cause of action, which is regarded as indivisible. If the plain-
tiff fails to join all those installments in one suit he is precluded 
from subsequently maintaining an action upon the ones not 
joined.53 The same is true as to various items of a running ac-
count. All items due and unpaid at the commencement of an 
action must be joined in that action, although, again, each one 
of them when it first accrues constitutes a distinct claim. 
If we consider the several breaches of contract as each giv-
ing rise, as they "originally" do, to a (distinct) cause of action 
or claim in the meaning of at least a minimum unit of judi-
cial action and relief, we can state the rule like this: The plain-
tiff is required to join in one action all claims he may have against 
the defendant for breaches of a single contract which occurred 
prior to the commencement of the action; a judgment on the 
merits as to any of such breaches precludes him from subsequent-
ly suing for the other breaches not so joined. On the other hand, 
as follows from the rule as well, the plaintiff is not precluded 
from bringing a subsequent action for breaches of the contract 
that have occurred after the commencement of a suit for previ-
ous breaches. As to such subsequent breaches the rule starts 
working anew, but separately from the action and the judgment 
which have covered the previous breaches. 
Furthermore, the so-called divisible contract does not come 
under the rule. This is the case when the parties, explicitly or 
implicitly, agree that a single contract shall have separable parts 
or that portions of the total obligation assumed shall be inde-
53 See also Taylor v. Invin W. Masters, Inc., (D.C. N.J. 1947) 74 F. Supp. 572 at 573 
with respect to commissions falling due in installments. 
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pendent of each other.54 If, for example, in a contract for the 
payment of money the obligation is represented by a series of 
promissory notes the holder may bring as many actions as there 
are promissory notes. A judgment on one of them would not 
preclude him from maintaining a subsequent suit on any one 
of the others. The several notes are looked at as each constitut-
ing a claim permanently separate. Accordingly, there is no "en-
tire" cause of action in the terminology of the doctrine against 
splitting, or, put another way, each note obligation is an entire 
cause of action in itself. Their joinder in one action is not re-
quired. It is merely permissive under the contract clause and 
the same-transaction clause of the codes.55 
What has been said about a single divisible contract is ordi-
narily also true in regard to several contracts. It would; however, 
be misleading, to use an argument a fortiori. As a rule, it is true, 
it may be said that several contracts do not constitute one entire 
claim, but as many claims as there are contracts. So the rule of 
required joinder of claims operates on the claims arising under 
each contract, but not on all the claims arising out of said con-
tracts collectively. Yet, this latter view may prevail where the 
contracts are closely intertwined,56 as in the case of a running 
account made up of items which do not arise under a single 
agreement.57 
It thus appears, on the one hand, that the rule of required 
joinder of claims may not apply although there is but one ( di-
visible) contract, and, on the other hand, that it may apply to a 
plurality of contracts, i.e., contracts intertwined or, in this sense, 
a "contract transaction." Whenever the rule does operate in a 
subsequent action it does so regardless of whether the plaintiff 
won or lost in his first suit. 
(b) In the field of torts. Suppose the defendant negligently 
caused an explosion thereby damaging plaintiff's houses A and 
B. Plaintiff brings an action for damages to his house A. The 
action is disposed of on the merits by a final judgment. He can-
not thereafter sue for the damage caused to his house B. This 
is so although two distinct property rights have been invaded 
and the plaintiff may, therefore, be said to have two claims, two 
"minimum" causes of action. The decisive fact is that the two 
54 See JUDGMENTS RF:sTATEMENT 253 (1942). 
55 See p. 802 supra. 
56 See CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., 480 (1947). 
57 Id. at 484, 485. 
816 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW .[Vol. 55 
property rights have been invaded, and, accordingly, the two 
claims have been brought about by the same wrongful act. In such 
a case the plaintiff is required to join all claims for damages he 
has against the defendant by reason of this wrongful act. If the 
explosion had caused damage to the plaintiff's house A and to 
his person, the same rule would apply in most jurisdictions.58 
It does not matter that one claim is for injury to property, the 
other for injury to the person. 
In Szostak v. Chevrolet Motor Co.59 the Supreme Court of 
Michigan also held the rule applicable in a case where the tor-
tious act was continuous. The plaintiffs alleged that drop ham-
mers in the defendant's forge plant caused their buildings A and 
B to vibrate and damaged them, and that noxious fumes were 
emitted from the plant to their discomfort. On these allegations 
they commenced two actions for damages, one involving build-
ing A (action A), the other one building B (action B). Action 
A was finally adjudicated on the merits before action B had pro-
ceeded to judgment. The court then dismissed action B. Talk-
ing in terms of splitting a single cause of action it pointed out 
that ". . . the tort, although continuous, was single in its de-
clared injurious effect. Plaintiffs do not charge that it may be 
divided as to time or otherwise so that a distinct and separate 
part of it may be traced to a specific injury to one building with-
out a corresponding effect on the other. The tort is declared 
upon as a unit and the damage it caused was a unit. Consequently 
the two suits constituted a splitting of the cause of action .... "60 
So the plaintiffs were in effect required to join in the first action 
their damage claim relating to building B with the one for build-
ing A. 
There is still another important aspect to the rule in the con-
text of continuous torts against realty. It is the possible distinc-
tion between past and future damages, meaning damages prior 
to the commencement of an action and subsequent thereto. The 
prevailing rule is that in the case of a continuous tort against 
realty the plaintiff is compelled to join his claims for past and 
58 See Blume, "Required Joinder of Claims,'' 45 MICH. L. R.Ev. 79'/ at 798 (1947); and, 
for example, Fields v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 273 Pa. 282, 117 A. 59 (1922), 
and Larzo v. Swift & Co., 129 W.Va. 436, 40 S.E. (2d) 811 (1946), where the courts, talking 
in terms of splitting, said the cause of action was the wrongful act as opposed to the re• 
suiting damages. In New York, for example, the plaintiff could sue for the damages on his 
house and bring a separate action for his personal injury. The same view prevails in Eng-
land. See CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., 488, 489 (1947). 
59 279 Mich. 603, 273 N.W. 284 (1937). 
60 Id. at 607. 
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future damages only if the defendant would have to commit a 
fresh wrong to undo the effect of the tort or where the injuries 
are legally permitted by the state.61 In the absence of these con-
ditions the plaintiff may bring two actions for past and future 
damages, respectively. 
As a further exemplification of the rule of compulsory join-
der, invasions of rights in rapid succession must be mentioned.62 
The defendant trespasses on plaintiff's land on successive days. 
In another case63 the plaintiff is injured while alighting from a 
streetcar because the motorman negligently starts the car that 
very moment; immediately thereafter the plaintiff falls into a 
trench negligently left by the defendant streetcar company be-
side the road, and sustains a further injury. 
In either case the plaintiff must join in one action his claims 
for all injuries caused prior to the commencement of the action, 
or else loses the claims not so joined when judgment is rendered 
on the merits. Again, it is immaterial that each one of the sev-
eral invasions upon its respective occurrence gave rise to a dis-
tinct claim and (theoretically at least) could have been sued upon 
separately. 
Summarizing, we can say that all claims for injuries caused 
prior to the commencement of an action in the course of the 
same tort occasion64 are required to be joined. 
From what has been said so far it is evident that the plain-
tiff cannot split one single substantive claim. And this, of course, 
applies in like manner to both contract and tort cases. So, for 
example, in the ice-tray case, above, it would have been prejudi-
cial for the plaintiff to claim in his first action only part of the 
royalties relative to the single ice trays. The judgment then would 
have deprived him not only of his contended claim for royalties 
on the double trays but also of the rest of the claim for the single 
trays. The same thing would have happened to the plaintiffs in 
the forge plant case had they claimed in action A part only of 
the damages on building A, etc. The plaintiff is not permitted 
to bring a part action first and, after judgment thereupon, to 
recover further or increased damages caused prior to the com-
61 See CLARK, Con& PLEADING, 2d ed., 487 (1947) who sets forth two examples: A 
structure on the plaintiff's land, necessitating a fresh entry by the defendant to remove it 
(fir.;t alternative); a railroad right of way (second alternative). 
62 See Blume, "Required Joinder of Claims," 45 MICH. L. REv. 797 at 800 (1947). 
63 JUDGMENTS REsTATEMENT 249 (1942). 
64 In the meaning illustrated, or "series of occasions," if you please. 
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mencement of the first action.65 This clearly manifests what 
the plaintiff is virtually required to join, i.e., all minimum units 
of claims for relief arising prior to the commencement of an ac-
tion from the same contract transaction66 or tort occasion, irre-
spective of how many claims he may be regarded to have accord-
ing to the substantive law.67 
There are some exceptions to the rule of required joinder 
of claims. It does not apply (I) where the plaintiff in the pro-
cedure adopted can prosecute part of his claims only and this 
procedure is essential to the preservation of his rights.68 This 
is mainly the case where cumulative remedies arise out of the 
same contract transaction or tort occasion, i.e., where the plain-
tiff is entitled to more than one kind of relief, and the relief 
sought in one action could not be had in the other action. This 
65 Cf. JUDGMENTS REsrATEMENT 246 (1942). 
66 The transaction idea in the context of compulsory joinder of claims appeared as 
early as 1858 in the case of Secor v. Sturgis, 16 N.Y. 548; Strong, J., stated the following 
on p. 554: "The rule does not prevent, nor is there any principal which precludes, the 
prosecution of several actions upon several causes of action .••• " All demands, of whatever 
nature, arising out of separate and distinct transactions, may be sued upon separately .... " 
(Emphasis mine.) The transaction test is applied not only to contract actions, but also to 
tort actions. But it is probably a mere matter of terminological taste whether to talk about 
a tort transaction or a tort occasion (or series of occasions). 
One other thing, to be sure, is noteworthy in connection with the transaction test. 
The codes in their usual general clause on permissive joinder provide that several causes 
of action may be joined "where they all arise out of the same transaction .•.. " If all de-
mands, arising out of the same contract or tort transaction, must be joined, and if in terms 
of the doctrine against splitting these all constitute one cause of action, there seems to be 
no conceivable possibility that more than one cause of action could arise out of the same 
transaction and that there remains any substance for the code clause at all. Put another 
way, does it not seem that all joinder of claims based upon the same transaction is com-
pulsory instead of permissive, as the code clause indicates? But this is not true in this 
generality, at least. In the case of divisible contracts, for example, joinder of claims is not 
required. According to the splitting doctrine there are several causes of action; and still, 
in the meaning of the code clause, one does probably have to say that they all arise out of 
the same transaction, although they do not in the meaning of the doctrine of required 
joinder. Hence, the joinder would be permissive, but not required. Furthermore, the 
code clause retains its importance in such proceedings as involve a plurality of parties 
on either side. And besides, it has often been said that the term cause of action may have 
different meanings in different contexts of the law. This cannot further be traced here, of 
course. But it seems safe to say that by virtue of the compulsory joinder doctrine the 
same-transaction clause of the codes for permissive joinder appears not to have as broad 
a substance as one might think prima facie. And this is more true the more one might be 
inclined to apply the compulsory joinder rule even in cases of several causes and be dis-
inclined to adhere strictly to the traditional "single-entire-clause" idea. Cf. also Schopflocher, 
"What Is a Single Cause of Action for the Purpose of the Doctrine of Res Judicata?" 21 
ORE. L. REv. 319 at 324 (1942). 
67 There are some courts and writers who advocate an even broader application of 
the rule. See, for example, Schopflocher, ""What Is a Single Cause of Action for the Pur-
pose of the Doctrine of Res Judicata," 21 ORE. L. REv. 319 (1942); Blume, "The Scope of a 
Civil Action," 42 MICH. L. REv. 257 (1943). But this is not the prevailing opinion, not yet, 
at least. Cf. CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., 144 (1947). 
68 Cf. JUDGMENTS REsrATEMENT 243, 255-257 (1942). 
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is largely a matter of the respective state procedures. If, for ex-
ample, in a case of conversion the plaintiff has an equitable remedy 
(specific restitution) as to one part of the items taken and a legal 
remedy (claim for value) as to the remainder, he may prosecute 
two actions in states which do not have the union of law and 
equity. The heterogeneity of the claimed reliefs would not in 
itself be sufficient, however, to justify an exception to the require-
ment of joinder. And, on the other hand, the exception may some-
times apply even to homogenous claims (such as money claims), 
as if, for example, the splitting is justified by limitations of ter-
ritorial jurisdiction.69 
Furthermore, the rule does not apply (2) where fraud or mis-
representation on the part of the defendant caused the plaintiff 
to omit some of his claims in the original action;70 (3) where the 
defendant fails to raise an objection in a subsequent action ( con-
sent). It is not a further exception to the rule, but rather a pre-
supposition of its applicability, that the parties to the subsequent 
action are the same as in the original action, 71 or privies of the 
latter. 
The exceptions mentioned are conspicuously suggestive of at 
least one of the main ideas upon which the rule of required 
joinder of claims is based. It is the primary aim to protect the de-
fendant against a multiplicity of suits. Such a multiplicity of suits 
is considered to be a vexation for the defendant. Consequently, 
it is tolerated only where absolutely necessary for the preserva-
tion of the plaintiff's rights (exception 1), or where the defendant 
has forfeited his protection by his own conduct (exceptions 2 and 3). 
At the same time the rule is designed to prevent "the wasting 
of the time of the courts"72 and the additional expenditure of 
money at the expense of the taxpayer. In this sense it is intended 
to serve the interest of the public. One of the original reasons 
for the rule was, and continues to be, the protection of the supe-
rior courts' jurisdiction.73 In view of the exceptions (2) and (3), 
however, the protection of the defendant seems to be the strong-
est of the underlying ideas. 
69 Cf. id. at 255, 270. See also 23 CYC. 383 (1906). 
70 JUDGMENTS REsrATEMENT 243, 255-257 (1942). Quite a number of jurisdictions also 
recognize faultless ignorance or mistake on the part of the plaintiff as an exception, even in 
the absence of fraud or misrepresentation on the side of the defendant. See annotations, 
2 A.L.R. 534 (1919); 142 A.L.R. 905 (1943). 
11 See CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., 472, 479 (1947). Cf. also JUDGMENTS REsrATEMENT 
244, 245 (1942). 
72 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., 473 (1947). 
73 This will be considered somewhat more closely below at p. 840 et seq. 
820 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
According to the prevailing notion the enforcement of the 
joinder requirement and the rule against splitting is confided to 
the doctrine of res judicata. The preclusion of the plaintiff µ-om 
maintaining subsequent actions on the claims omitted in the 
original action is thought of as a genuine effect of res judicata. It 
is a natural counterpart of this conception that the rule of re-
quired joinder of claims results in a plea of pendency in con-
temporaneous actions whenever it would lead to a plea of res 
judicata in consecutive actions. That is to say, if a plaintiff splits 
his claims arising out of the same contract transaction or tort 
occasion among several contemporaneous suits, pendency may be 
pleaded in all but one-the first-of them,74 just as res judicata 
might be in case that one had proceeded to final judgment be-
fore the others. To this extent the joinder is required in a more 
literal sense of the word. 
The underlying rationale and the particular conception of 
res judicata just sketched are the keys to the comprehension of 
the basic differences between .the American and the German law 
which are now to be discussed. 
3. Comparative View. In the German law, too, res judicata 
serves a preclusive function. On the one hand it binds all courts 
to the conclusion reached in the prior judgment, within the limits 
of identity of claims and parties. On the other, it precludes the 
parties from contradicting this conclusion in a subsequent ac-
tion.75 But this preclusion, too, is scrupulously restricted to the 
same "claim" in the meaning of ZPO, section 322 (1) which pro-
vides: (I) Judgments are capable of becoming res judicata only 
insofar as the claim set forth in the complaint or in the counter-
claim, has been adjudicated upon. With some exceptions, al-
most exclusively statutory in nature, required joinder of claims 
in the meaning of the American law is not known in the German 
law. This statement needs closer consideration, to be sure. We 
have seen that in terms of the doctrine against splitting an en-
tire claim, or cause of action, it is but one "single" claim in the 
American law, too, that is embraced by res judicata. What, after 
all, is the difference then? It is hidden in the concepts of "claim" 
and res judicata. "Claim" as used in ZPO, section 322 (1) and in 
the German writing on civil procedure is something basically 
74 See, in place of the many other authorities, CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., 472 
(1947). 
75 See, for example, HELLWIG, SYSTEM DES DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS, Part 1, pp. 777 
(1912). 
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different from the "single, entire claim, or cause of action" in 
the meaning of American civil procedure. 
The German law has come strictly to distinguish between claim 
in the meaning of the substantive law and claim in the meaning 
of the law of procedure, or-as is an equally common way of put-
ting it-between substantive claim and "procedural claim" (Pro-
zessualer Anspruch). Section 322 (1) is one of many provisions 
of the Zivilprozessordnung in which the term claim (Anspruch) 
is used in the second, i.e., procedural sense. T,!ie procedural claim, 
is plaintiff's assertion of a substantive right or claim, and it is 
(has to be) individualized76 (I) by the prayer for relief and, if 
necessary, (2) by the facts, the historical event or occurrence 
upon which the plaintiff relies as the factual basis of his as-
sertion.77 Categories of the substantive law do not contribute to 
the individualization of the procedural claim. This is now the 
generally prevailing view both in the decisions and among legal 
writers. The Zivilprozessordnung itself is silent as to the exact 
meaning of "claim." But in section 253, subsection 2, paragraph 
2, it provides that the complaint must contain "a particular prayer 
for relief" and a statement "of the ground of the claim asserted" 
(the cause of claim, or action).78 This has been construed as in-
dicating by what the subject matter of the action and, in turn, 
the object of res judicata, is individualized, and hence, what it is. 
This construction has resulted in what has been described above 
as the now prevailing conception of (procedural) "claim" in the 
meaning of the law of procedure in general and of the law of 
res judicata [ZPO section 322 (I)] in particular. Being an asser-
tion of a substantive claim or right, the procedural claim exists 
irrespective of whether the asserted right or claim has actually 
accrued or not. 
The most important point for the present discussion is the 
fact that the prayer for relief has an essential function in individ-
ualizing the procedural claim and thereby, according to ZPO, 
section 322 (1), in determining the scope of res judicata. The 
object of the action and of the res judicata effect of the final 
judgment is only as broad as what the plaintiff by his particular 
prayer for relief offers for judicial determination. According to 
76 For the purpose of distinguishing it from all other possible assertions of a right or 
claim which this plaintiff may make against this defendant. 
77 Cf., for example, ROSENBERG, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS, 5th ed., 
378, particularly 384, 385, with ample citations (1951). 
78 Id. at 386. 
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the American doctrine against splitting a claim or cause of ac-
tion, as described above, it is the "entire" claim, or cause of 
action, which is embraced by res judicata. Stating it in terms of 
required joinder of claims, it is all minimum units of claims, 
identical or different in kind, that the plaintiff may have against 
the defendant out of the same contract transaction or tort occasion. 
To this extent the plaintiff's prayer for relief has no determina-
tive function.79 Under ZPO, section 308 (1), a German" ... court 
is not authorized to award to a party anything that has not been 
prayed for," and this has been construed to mean also that the 
court cannot abjudicate what the plaintiff has not prayed to have 
adjudged.80 In the cases of required joinder of claims the Amer-
ican courts, to be sure, do not adjudge nor abjudicate beyond 
the prayer either. But it is the res judicata effect of the judg-
ment itself which is conceived to bring about a tacit abjudication 
of the claims not joined. Under the essence of ZPO, section 
308 (I) in conjunction with section 322 (I), and in the absence 
of another statutory provision to the contrary, not even this is 
conceivable within the German law. '\,Vhat the court by virtue 
of the law is prohibited to declare in the judgment, the latter 
may not effect "on its own hook," so to speak. Even if the court 
would explicitly go beyond the prayer-be it by way of adjudg-
ing or by way of abjudicating anything that the plaintiff had 
not prayed for to be adjudged-such a violation of section 308 (I) 
would not only be reversible error, but also would exempt the 
judgment from the operation of res judicata to that extent.81 This 
judgment would not be "capable of becoming res judicata" be-
cause it would not adjudicate upon "the claim set forth in the 
complaint," but upon a different procedural claim or claims. 
From what has been said as to the two factors individualizing 
the particular procedural claim, it follows that the identity of 
such a claim ceases as soon as the prayer for relief (with respect 
to quantity or kind) or the essential core of facts is shifted. Only 
the former is material in the present connection. Neither the 
court nor the judgment itself may expressly or tacitly shift the 
plaintiff's prayer for relief. The German law of res judicata 
does not sanction this. It matters not that the plaintiff does have 
79 Cf. 23 CYc. 383 (1906); 50 C.J.S., Judgments §648, at p. 89 (1947). 
80 Cf. ROSENBERG, note 77 supra, p. 588; HELLWIG, note 75 supra, Part I, p. 411. 
81 Cf. ROSENBERG, note 77 supra, §150 I 3 a, P· 689; STEIN-JONAS-SCHOENKE, KoM-
MENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG, 17th ed., §322 V 2c (1953) and the cases cited in either 
work. 
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more claims against the defendant than the one or the ones which 
he has included in his prayer, and that they all did arise from 
the same contract transaction or tort occasion. As a general rule 
he alone is the master of his action. It is he who, by his prayer, 
determines the scope of judicial adjudication. 
The law of res judicata yields to this principle and does not 
require a joinder of claims, neither of additional claims of the 
same kind nor of claims of a different kind. This is, as intimated 
previously, one of the main fundamental differences in the con-
ceptions of German and American law. The prevailing Amer-
ican doctrine relating to splitting and to compulsory joinder does 
not hesitate to conceive the subsequent preclusion as a genuine 
res judicata effect.82 According to German conceptions it is hard 
to conceive that the operation of res judicata may go beyond the 
object of the action, the subject matter in controversy. It might 
be argued, of course, that this inhibition could be remedied by 
the assumption that res judicata determines the object of the ac-
tion, and not vice versa. This, however, seems not only to be 
somewhat arbitrary but also rather unrealistic. Taking the Amer-
ican rule of required joinder of claims, it is difficult to assume 
that all the claims which the plaintiff omitted to join and which, 
therefore, are covered by the preclusive res judicata effect of the 
judgment, should have been part of the object of action, of the 
subject matter in controversy. Should this be true merely be-
cause of the scope of the res judicata effect, although the court 
never passed upon those claims and was not even asked by the 
plaintiff to do so? Hardly. Nor can this conceptual difficulty be 
removed by speaking of "one single, entire claim." Thereby it 
could only be shifted from one relating to a plurality of things 
to one relating to multiple parts of one thing. The arguments 
would be the same. If within the scope of compulsory joinder 
one attributes the preclusion to res judicata, as the prevailing 
American notion does, it is, therefore, better to admit squarely 
that to this extent res judicata embraces more than was actually 
the subject matter of the action. Considering the German reluc-
tance to follow this conception as a dogmatic possibility, the argu-
ment could be made that the same results can be reached by con-
82 Cf., for example, Blume, "The Scope of a Civil Action," 42 MICH. L. REv. 257 at 
282 (1943); Blume, "Required Joinder of Claims," 45 MICH. L. REv. 797 at 798 (1947); 
CLARK, CODE PLEADING, 2d ed., 473 (1947). In the JUDGMENTS RE.sTATEMENT, too, the section 
dealing with splitting a cause of action has been made a part of the law of res judicata. 
Cf. p. 242 et seq. (1942). 
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ceiving the preclusion83 as a sort of penalty, a special effect, not 
of, but in consequence of res judicata. This is, of course, a per-
missible argument. But the German law has not adopted it ex-
cept in a few situations, 84 and it thinks of them as exceptions. 
And it is not only the fact that the res judicata effect does have 
to overstep the limits of the object of action which makes the 
German law shrink from a broader application of the compulsory 
joinder idea as realized in the American law. This reluctance is 
as much caused by the fact that the preclusion necessarily results 
in detriment to the plaintiff, no matter whether he has won or 
lost his original (part) action. The American rule of required 
joinder of claims is not realized by way of collateral estoppel, 
but by means of merger and bar.85 The employment of collateral 
estoppel would have the effect that issues of law or fact 
which were litigated and adjudicated upon in the original action 
could not be relitigated in a subsequent action on another claim. 
The decisioD: on them would be conclusive. Due to the fact that 
at least in the majority of the pertinent cases the consecutive ac-
tions are based upon common main issues of law or fact, this would 
in many cases mean that the plaintiff wins on a subsequent ac-
tion because he won on the original one, or that he loses on the 
former because he lost on the latter. At any rate, different out-
comes in the consecutive actions would have to be based upon 
reasons which are independent of the issues conclusively decided 
upon in the original judgment. The plaintiff could never lose 
on a subsequent action merely because he did not make its ob-
ject a part of the original action. But this is, indeed, the result 
of the American rule of required joinder of claims. If the plain-
tiff's first action for part of his claims has been successful, then 
all claims against the defendant arising from the same contract 
transaction or tort occasion merge in the judgment. What the 
judgment awards is all the plaintiff can ever receive. He is barred 
from maintaining an action for the rest of his claims; there are 
not even any left after the merger. In case the plaintiff has lost 
on his first action for part of his claims, then all claims (arising 
from, etc.) are barred. 
The German law does not even recognize a collateral effect 
of res judicata in the pertinent cases although it does recognize 
it as such. If, for example, the plaintiff in an action for declaratory 
83 So far as it goes beyond the subject matter of the action. 
84 See discussion below at p. 832 et seq. 
85 Cf. Blume, "Required Joinder of Claims," 45 MICH. L. REv. 797 at 802 (1947). 
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judgment asks the court to declare that he is the owner of cer-
tain premises, and the plaintiff recovers a judgment to that effect,. 
the defendant can no longer dispute plaintiff's ownership in a 
subsequent action for recovery of possession based upon said 
ownership. Although a different procedural claim is presented 
in the second action (a different relief is sought) res judicata of 
the first judgment operates collaterally insofar as the incidental 
question of ownership is concerned which has been the direct 
subject matter of the first action and judgment. But the collateral 
effect of res judicata does not go beyond the original procedural 
claim; especially does it not cover issues of fact or law preced-
ing the adjudication, or logical consequences following therefrom. 
If, for example, the plaintiff had only sued for recovery of pos-
ession, though basing his claim on the ground of his being the 
owner, the judgment granting the relief would not be res judicata 
on the question of ownership, because this was not asked for in 
the prayer and, hence, not "the claim set forth in the complaint." 
There would be no collateral effect of res judicata on this issue 
in a subsequent action on whatever claim. The same is true as 
to the cases in our context. A judgment on part of one or more 
claims has no collateral effect on the rest.86 The existence or 
nonexistence of a part of the entire claim is not thought of as 
involving the question of existence or nonexistence of the asserted 
remainder. This is so even in the case where, for example, all 
claims, if any, arose out of the same contract and the court dis-
missed the part action on the ground that the contract was void. 
As a matter of fact it may be difficult for the plaintiff to succeed 
in a later action for the rest of his claims; as a matter of law, 
however, he is not prohibited from doing so. The decision on 
the validity or invalidity of the contract-as all incidental find-
ings of the court-has no part in the res judicata effect because 
it was not asked for in the prayer for relief. Only the final con-
clusion of the court directly bearing on the procedural claim it-
self, as individualized by the prayer and the facts relied upon, 
enjoys res judicata effect.87 
If we can thus see the German law rejecting a collateral effect 
of res judicata in our pertinent cases, it is only natural that, as a 
rule, it also declines to require joinder of claims by applying a gen-
86 Cf., for example, ROSENBERG, LEmulUCH DES DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS, 5th ed., 
§150 I 3 a, p. 689 (1951). 
87 Cf. id., §150 I 1, p. 688, II, 1, p. 691; STEIN·JONAS·SCHOENKE, KOMMENTAR ZUR 
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG, 17th ed., §322 V (1953). 
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eral preclusion equivalent to merger and bar-weapons even sharper 
than collateral estoppel! It is perfectly clear, therefore, that all the 
cases which have been stated above as illustrations of the compul-
sory joinder rule would be decided the other way under the Ger-
man law. 
Let us recall the principal German case discussed above88 
where the plaintiff brought two successive actions for breaches of 
the same contract; first, an action for damages sustained by the 
depreciation of his equipment, and secondly an action for damages 
suffered by loss of profits because the defendant had intentionally 
prevented the plaintiff from completely performing the contract. 
From the prayer for relief in conjunction with the facts relied upon 
in the two complaints it appeared that the plaintiff was asserting 
a different right in each action, in other words, that his assertion 
of a right, i.e., his procedural claim in his second action was dif-
ferent from the one in his first action. Hence, the first adjudica-
tion exerted no res judicata effect on the subject matter of the 
second action. On his first action for damages to the equipment, 
to be sure, the plaintiff had lost partially. But this prevented him 
only from subsequently claiming the damages rejected with re-
spect to the equipment. This claim and only this one was spent 
and res judicata. The claim for loss of profits was one different 
from that, and its adjudication also was in no way dependent 
upon the decision on the former claim, so that neither a direct 
nor a collateral effect of res judicata, within, the meaning of the 
German law, could come into question. 
In 1 RGZ 349 (1880), the Reichsgericht held permissible a suit 
for interest after an action for the principal had been adjudicated 
previously. In Warn. 1929, p. 208, No. 115, the plaintiff in a 
prior action brought on section 288 (1) of Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch 
{BGB), the German civil code, had recovered interest for the 
defendant's default in performing a certain obligation, and there-
after in a second suit claimed further default damages (loss of 
profits) according to BGB, section 288 (2), which was granted. 
The fact that the second action referred to a different provision 
of the civil code was not in itself decisive; but it was the fact 
that the plaintiff prayed for a different relief. In 123 RGZ 44 
(1928) the plaintiff in his first action, in which he recovered in-
demnity for the expropriation of certain premises, had made a 
mistake in computing the amount of damages; he was allowed 
88 Note 37 supra. 
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to claim the increased damages in a· second action. In all of these 
cases the claims raised in the second suit had accrued prior to the 
commencement of the first action! Under the American rule of 
required joinder of claims the plaintiff would have been pre-
cluded by res judicata from maintaining a second action in each 
case. 
The American rule does not allow subsequent recovery of 
increased damages if they were caused prior to the commence-
ment of the original suit. The fact that the plaintiff was unable 
to prove the full amount of the damages suffered makes no dif-
ference. 89 He may, to be sure, avail himself of the possibility of 
moving for a new trial on the ground of inadequacy of damages 
or of newly discovered evidence.90 These proceedings, however, 
subject to a broad discretion of the trial court, do not open inde-
pendent new actions in spite of the res judicata effect of the for-
mer adjudication, but are proceedings in the original action in 
order to remove that otherwise operating res judicata effect. They 
do not constitute a genuine exception to the rule of compulsory 
joinder of claims. The German law of res judicata precludes 
the plaintiff from subsequently claiming increased damages or 
the like only under special circumstances. Warn. 1925, p. 186, 
No. 138, for example, presented the following situation: The 
plaintiff had lent to the defendant several Persian rugs. While 
in the defendant's possession said rugs were stolen by a third per-
son. In his action for damages the plaintiff prayed for such a 
sum "as according to the court's discretion91 is necessary to re-
place the rugs, said sum being calculated tentatively to amount 
to 250 Goldmark." The plaintiff was awarded 250 Goldmark. 
In a subsequent second action the plaintiff contended that the 
rugs had been worth 3,000 Goldmark, and he claimed additional 
2,750 Goldmark accordingly. The Reichsgericht dismissed on 
the ground of ZPO, section 322 (1). It pointed out that if the 
plaintiff submits the amount of the damages to the court's dis-
cretion, suggesting a certain amount himself, and the court, then, 
in exercising its discretion follows the plaintiff's suggestion and 
awards the sum suggested as full damages, the plaintiff's claim is 
completely adjudicated. The plaintiff cannot thereafter claim 
increased damages. This reasoning is perfectly in accord with the 
89 Cf. JUDGMENTS RE5TATEMENT 246 (1942). 
90Ibid. 
91 Such a prayer is admissible in certain types of damage cases according to the special 
provision of ZPO, §287. 
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rule of section 322 (1). In a case like this the plaintiff himself 
by his prayer for relief submits his total claim for damages to 
judicial discretion and adjudication. Thence it necessarily fol-
lows that in a subsequent action for "increased damages" the plain-
tiff cannot escape asserting a claim which already had been (part 
of) the subject matter of the previous action and adjudication. 
And this very identity brings res judicata into effect. Further-
more, and of course, the plaintiff is precluded from afterward 
claiming an additional amount insofar as such an amount was 
prayed for and explicitly rejected in the original action.92 An-
other device to reach a partial preclusion under the German law 
is the assumption of a waiver on the part of the plaintiff. But 
such an assumption is not justified by the mere fact that the plain-
tiff in his original action did not make a reservation of further 
claims. The law of procedure does not require him to do so.93 
There must be some additional conduct showing that the plain-
tiff meant to waive further claims, and that the defendant agreed 
to that.94 For waiver is thought of as a contract governed by the 
rules of substantive law. The plaintiff in such cases is precluded, 
not by virtue of the res judicata effect of the former judgment, 
but because his additional claim or claims have been extinguished 
according to the substantive law.95 
A corresponding difference between the American and the 
German law exists with respect to the plea of pendency. The 
American law has its rule of required joinder of claims. It results 
in a plea of res judicata when consecutive actions are brought, in 
a plea of pendency when the actions are pending contemporane-
ously. The German law, as we have seen, in its general rule does 
not require a joinder of claims, no matter whether they all arose 
out of the same contract transaction or tort occasion, respectively, 
and prior to the commencement of the particular suit. Res judi-
cata cannot be pleaded in a later action. Accordingly, the defend-
ant cannot avail himself of the plea of pendency in contemporane-
ous action, provided only that the plaintiff in each one of them 
states a claim sufficiently individualized as to be distinguished 
from the other ones. 
92 Cf. JW 1896, p. 691, No. 18 (note 88 supra and text theretofore) as to the one part 
of the claim for the equipment damages; furthermore, 73 RGZ 213 at 219 (1910). 
93 See Warn. 1929, p. 208, No. 115. 
94 Cf. ROSENBERG, 1.EHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS, 5th ed., §150 I 3 a, 
p. 690 (1951); STEIN-JONAS-SCHOENKE, KOMMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS, 17th ed., §322 
V 2 d (1952). 
95 Ibid. 
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Two entirely different policies are, thus, conspicuous within 
the two legal systems in regard to a plurality of claims arising 
out of the same contract transaction or tort occasion. The Ger-
man law does not, as the American law does, presume a multi-
plicity of suits to be harassing to the defendants and time-wasting 
to the courts. Within the limits of some exceptions96 the plain-
tiff is at liberty to bring as many actions as he sees fit. He is, as 
it has been put previously, the master of his claims and is not re-
quired to join same. What has been said, comparatively, so far 
is more or less an elaboration of the dogmatic differences oper-
ative against the background of different policies. Two points 
are worth mentioning now which should be likely to cast at least 
some light on those policy differences themselves. One of them 
goes to the position of the defendant, the other one concerns the 
courts. 
A considerable part of what has made the American law re-
gard a multiplicity of suits as a vexation of the defendant may, 
under German conceptions, be thought of as being remedied by 
the legal possibility that the defendant may ask for a negative 
declaratory judgment.97 He may, in a counterclaim to the plain-
tiff's part action or in a separate suit, assert that out of the par-
ticular transaction, occasion or event relied upon in plaintiff's 
action, the plaintiff has no other claim or claims against him, and 
he may pray for a corresponding declaratory judgment. This 
remedy is available for the defendant in those frequent cases 
where the plaintiff pretends to have a further claim or claims 
and the defendant believes them unjustified. The res judicata 
effect of such a declaratory judgment in defendant's (the defend-
ant to the original action) favor would protect him against later 
suits insofar as the court has declared that the plaintiff has no 
further claim or claims out of said transaction, etc. The effect 
is the same as if an action or actions of the plaintiff based upon 
such claims had been dismissed. 
In cases where the defendant believes that the contract, upon 
which the plaintiff has based his claim in litigation and further 
pretended claims, is invalid, he may bring what is called a nega-
tive Inzidentfeststellungsklage~ i.e., literally translated, a negative 
incidental declaratory action. This he can do in the form of a 
counterclaim within the pending action. 98 He also can do it in a 
96 See discussion below at p. 832 et seq. 
97 Provided for by ZPO, §256. 
98 So provided for by ZPO, §280. 
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separate action.99 Again, a judgment granting him the relief 
sought would protect him against all claims predicated on said 
contract. The propriety of defendant's assertion that the contract 
is invalid would be res judicata in the original and any collateral 
proceeding for prosecution of such claims.100 
It does not appear that in the American law the possibility 
for the defendant to obtain negative declaratory relief has had 
any influence on the policy considerations relating to the prob-
lem of required joinder of claims. Even though not known under 
the old common law, declaratory relief was to some extent rec-
ognized in the old courts of chancery and is now, also in negative 
form, authorized by statutes in force throughout the United 
States.101 It might be argued that the rule against splitting claims 
became well settled under the common law long before (negative) 
declaratory relief had come to be recognized. On one hand, how-
ever, the rule against splitting was not applied as broadly under 
the common law as it has been later, and on the other hand it 
seems probable that the striving for protection of the superior 
courts' jurisdiction and the effort to cut down the engrossment 
of the courts would have. turned the scale in favor of the rule 
anyway. 
So far as the defendant is concerned, the American rule, as 
it stands, protects him against a multiplicity of suits not only in 
those cases which under the German law are believed sufficient-
ly remedied by the possibility of obtaining negative declaratory 
relief, and at least part of which could be taken care of by a col-
lateral estoppel under the American law, but it protects the de-
fendant even in those cases where he himself does not think that 
the claims are unjustified and would not consider obtaining nega-
tive declaratory relief in order to have the plaintiff precluded 
from afterwards maintaining an action or actions on further 
claims. In other words, not only a multiplicity of unjustified 
suits, but also a plurality of (substantively) justified suits is thought 
qf as a vexation of the defendant. The German law has not taken 
99 According to ZPO, §256. 
100 ZPO, §322 (I). This kind of action is the very instrument (and the only one) 
by which a party can have the res judicata effect extended to legal relations on which the 
final conclusion on the matter directly in controversy is dependent, namely, by making 
said relations themselves the direct subject, i.e., "claim" in the meaning of §322 (I), of an 
action or counterclaim. 
101 Cf. BLUME, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 30 (1955); JUDGMENTS REsl'ATE!IIENT 342 
et seq. (1942). 
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this view as a general rule. The defendant may try to protect 
himself by bringing a negative declaratory action against the 
pretense of further claims where he sees fit to do so.102 As long 
as the plaintiff does not pretend such claims, or if they are justi-
fied, the defendant is not regarded as needing and deserving pro-
tection of the kind the American rule affords him. Against a 
multiplicity of well-founded suits, in particular, the defendant 
may protect himself by payment. Some exceptions are to be dis-
cussed below, but they will show, either, that the term "vexation" 
has a much more restrictive meaning in the German law of pro-
cedure, or, that the underlying rationale has nothing to do with 
the defendant at all. 
Another point, which probably has had some bearing upon 
the different policies, is the fact that the German courts do not 
sit with a jury in civil actions. To save the time of the courts 
and to avoid additional expenditures at the expense of the tax-
payer has been one of the major reasons for the American rule 
of required joinder of claims. The necessity of impaneling sepa-
rate juries in case of multiple suits is very likely one of the grav-
est points in the scope of the considerations of this sort. It is of 
course true that the same rule applies in such proceedings at 
law as are carried on without a jury and likewise in proceedings 
in equity where the court always sits alone. But this does not 
refute what has been said about the influence of the jury trial. 
In other areas of the American law, too, comparable situations 
can be found. It is generally agreed, for example, that a great 
many of the rules of evidence are to be ascribed to the fact that 
the evidence is put before the jury, i.e., the twelve laymen in 
the box. And yet, the same rules generally apply in proceedings 
without jury. In contemplation of law the jury trial is (still) con-
sidered to be the normal kind of trial. 
That the German courts do not have to bother with impanel-
ing juries is another possible explanation for the general toler-
ance of the German law of a multiplicity of suits even where all 
the claims arose from the same contract transaction or tort oc-
casion and could have been joined in the original action. 
As already suggested, there are some exceptions in the Ger-
man law to the general rule that a joinder of claims is not re-
quired. 
102 If it turns out to be successful the opponent has to pay both parties' expenses of the 
litigation, ZPO, §91. 
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One group of exceptions is based on express statutory provi-
sions. Section 54 of the German Patentgesetz has previously been 
mentioned. The plaintiff, who has brought an action against the 
defendant for violation of a patent, cannot institute another action 
against this defendant for violation of another patent on the basis 
of the same wrongful act or one identical in kind,1°3 except where 
the plaintiff in the exercise of due care could not join the claim 
for the other patent in his original action. Whether the plain-
tiff won or lost on his first action makes no difference. 
Another case of this kind, and the most famous one, is regu-
lated by ZPO, section 616, first sentence. The provision concerns 
matrimonial causes and reads as follows: "The plaintiff, whose 
action for divorce or action for cancellation of marriage104 was 
dismissed,105 cannot later on base his right, to ask for divorce or 
cancellation, on such facts as he alleged in the former litigation, 
or as he could allege in the former litigation or by way of join-
ing the actions." The plaintiff is thus required to join all claims 
for divorce and cancellation in one proceeding,106 except where, 
even in the exercise of due care, he cannot do so. 
Another provision of this type, drafted after the model of 
ZPO, section 616 is section 17 of the German Mieterschutzgesetz.107 
The landlord is required to join in one action all claims against 
the tenant for termination of the lease. If an action has been dis-
missed on the merits the landlord cannot subsequently maintain 
103 Under the American law the same result could be reached by the assumption of 
one tort occasion so far as the same wrongful act is concerned, and possibly by the assump-
tion of one series of occasions as regards wrongful acts identical in kind. 
104 While the action for divorce is brought on the ground of violations of marriage 
duties or other conduct or facts having occurred after the contraction of marriage, the 
action for cancellation is based upon facts or conditions that occurred prior thereto or 
were operative, respectively, during the very act of contraction, such as relevant error, de-
ceit, coercion and the like. The judgment granting cancellation has no retroactive effect. 
The action for cancellation is to be distinguished from the action for annulment whose 
bases are fatal defects in the contraction of marriage (incompetency, lack of form, etc.) or 
certain cogent impediments (bigamy, close relationship, etc.). The judgment in this case 
is retroactive. 
105 On the merits. 
100 Under the American law this would be different. Although the plaintiff may be 
precluded from suing a second time for a particular relief on a ground other than the 
one alleged in the first action and already existing at that time, this generally does not 
apply to status proceedings. Thus, plaintiff may bring another divorce action on a dif-
ferent ground even though it existed and was known to him at the time of the first action. 
See JUDGMENTS REsTATEMENT 337 (1942). 
107 The statute is a result of the shortage of living quarters after the two world wars 
and is designed to protect the tenants. As a rule, the landlord cannot terminate the lease 
whenever he sees fit, but he has to bring an action for judicial termination on the basis 
of certain grounds recognized by the statute (such as non-payment of the rent, other vio-
lations of duties by the tenant, urgent own needs of the landlord and the like). 
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another action for termination on the ground of such facts as he 
alleged or could have alleged in the original action.108 
So far as these provisions require a joinder of different claims 
it is not conceived to be enforced by res judicata. This consti-
tutes at least a theoretical difference from the prevailing Amer-
ican conception. In the patent case the allegation of a different 
patent leads to a different procedural claim in the meaning of 
the law of res judicata because the identity of the patent is an 
essential element in individualizing the procedural claim for its 
infringement. Res judicata being confined to the same claim 
under the German law, it would, accordingly, not bar a later 
action for the same ·wrongful act on the ground of a different 
patent. And it also would not bar an action for an act "identical 
in kind," as the statute does, because here again, a new proced-
ural claim is presented. Likewise, in the case of ZPO, section 616 
concerning the matrimonial causes, res judicata alone would not 
bring about the effect desired. If the plaintiff's action for divorce 
was dismissed res judicata would, at any rate, not preclude the 
plaintiff from afterward maintaining an action for cancellation 
of marriage, because he would be praying for a different relief 
and relying upon facts necessarily different from the ones alleged 
in the divorce action. The same would be true in the reverse 
case where the action dismissed was for cancellation and the later 
action seeks a divorce. Claims for cancellation are not the sub-
ject matter of a divorce action, and vice versa.109 What could be 
accomplished by res judicata at the most would, therefore, be a 
preclusion of further divorce claims after the dismissal of a divorce 
action, and of further claims for cancellation after an action for 
cancellation had been dismissed. And if you take the view that 
also in proceedings like these, whose objective is the change of 
a legal state by constitutive judicial act Gudgment), the subject 
matter, i.e., the procedural claim, is not the assertion of a right 
to the change absolutely, but as individualized by particular 
facts,11° then, res judicata can accomplish even less: it would not 
10s The American law does not have a statute like this. But there is a similar proposi-
tion. Successive actions on different grounds to cancel a contract or deed are not per-
mitted if the grounds alleged in a later action could have been presented in the original 
action. See JUDGMENTS RllsTATEMENT 261 (1942). 
109 View of the great majority, including the Supreme Court. Cf. ROSENBERG, LEHRBUCH 
DES DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS, 5th ed., §161, III 4, p. 742 (1951). 
110 This, indeed, has been the notion generally prevailing at least outside the range 
of ZPO, §616 with respect to other, like proceedings. Cf. 3 HELLWIG, LEHRBUCH DES 
DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS 27 (1903). 
834 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
even preclude an unsuccessful divorce plaintiff from later rais-
ing further claims for divorce on the ground of different cores 
of facts.111 And it would be the same after a dismissed cancella-
tion action with respect to subsequent claims for cancellation. 
This very view is important in connection with section 17 Mieter-
schutzgesetz above. If in the landlord's action for judicial ter-
mination of the lease the assertion of his right to the termination 
as such is the subject matter, then there is but one procedural 
claim, irrespective of different cores of facts possibly relied upon, 
and res judicata can easily take care of this case even under the 
German law. A problem of required joinder of claims does not 
come up. As pointed out in note 110, however, this is not the 
, prevailing view, and the statute itself not only by the mere tak-
ing up of an express and otherwise superfluous provision, but 
also by additional l;mguage indicates that it is not based on this 
view either. In other words, reliance upon different fact situa-
tions as bases for the asserted right of termination leads to differ-
ent procedural claims not covered by res judicata: 
There is one other situation where the German law requires 
such a joinder of claims. This, too, is a case of an action for judicial 
change of a legal condition. If a judgment debtor after the ad-
judication acquires a defense ( called in German law "an excep-
tion") against the judgment creditor's claim-by payment, release, 
allowance of time to pay, and the like-but has nevertheless to face 
the impending execution by the creditor (who may contest the 
payment, etc.), he may as a plaintiff bring an action against the 
creditor to have the execution of the judgment enjoined and 
declared inadmissible. The legal condition to be changed by a 
constitutive judgment is the executability of the former judgment. 
Section 767 (3) ZPO compels the plaintiff (debtor) to join in his 
suit all exceptions (defenses) that he may have against the judg-
ment debt and that he can join in the exercise of due care. Again, 
according to what has been said above, the subject matter of such 
an action is not merely one procedural claim for declaring the 
execution inadmissible as such, but as many procedural claims as 
the plaintiff alleges exceptions. If, therefore, the plaintiff contrary 
to section 767 (3) ZPO should fail to join some available claim 
(exception), and lose on the one he asserted, res judicata as laid 
111 In our context only such facts are of any interest, of course, as accrued prior to the 
original adjudication. To rely upon subsequently accruing facts is not prohibited by any 
preclusion. 
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down in section 322 (1) would not bar a later action on the 
omitted claim (exception). 
From all that has been said it is quite clear that in the cases 
where the German law does require a joinder of claims and 
enforces it by way of subsequent preclusion, the enforcement, so 
far as different procedural claims are concerned, does not depend 
on res judicata, as is generally assumed for the American law. It 
is rather effected by a special, statutorily provided preclusion 
which goes beyond the object of the action and of res judicata. 
A similar distinction between res judicata preclusion and a special 
preclusion as penalty has sometimes been intimated in the Amer-
ican literature on compulsory joinder. Schopflocher, for example, 
has advocated such a distinction.112 He has favored a narrow 
concept of "cause of action" for the purpose of res judicata, pretty 
much following the substantive law. A special preclusion as 
penalty should apply with respect to causes of action arising from 
the same transaction, but not joined. In other words, the require-
ment to join several causes of action (claims) would not be 
enforced by res judicata, the latter being confined to the "same" 
cause of action as restrictively described by Schopflocher.113 He 
has pointed to the difference that should be observed with respect 
to the two kinds of preclusion. Res judicata should work auto-
matically irrespective of whether the plaintiff was at fault or not; 
the special preclusion, on the other hand, should be a penalty 
against the plaintiff for having neglected procedural duties. This 
idea bears much resemblance to the German conception. The 
res judicata effect of ZPO section 322 (1), confined, as it is, to 
the particular claim in litigation, is entirely independent of any 
fault on the part of the plaintiff; yet, the statutory provisions 
discussed, which require a joinder of claims, all make explicit 
or implicit reference to "due care"! Considering the exceptions 
to the American rule of required joinder of claims, it, indeed, 
becomes obvious that elements of fault on the part of the 
plaintiff are involved in the rule although it is conceived to be 
enforced by res judicata. The defendant's consent to the splitting-
to take that up first-as a recognized exception may not clearly 
support this statement because in most jurisdictions, as opposed 
to the German law, res judicata, to be effective, must always be 
112 "What Is a Single Cause of Action for the Purpose of the Doctrine of Res Judicata?" 
21 ORE. L. REV. 319 at 363, 364 (1942). 
113 It will be noted, of course, that the restriction itself is different in nature from the 
one used with respect to the Germ.an "procedural claim." 
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pleaded by the defendant anyway. That the defendant is em-
powered to consent to the non-observance of res judicata by· 
omitting the plea is, accordingly, 4 general feature of the 
American law of res judicata and not one peculiar to the field 
of compulsory joinder. The exception involving the plaintiff 
who, in the original action, sought a remedy applicable only to 
part of his entire claim, however, more clearly reveals the element 
of fault. This is even more true of the third exception which 
allows the plaintiff to bring a later action on an omitted claim 
if the defendant had concealed same from the plaintiff. Even 
under the American doctrine of res judicata fraud or misrep-
resentation on the part of a party generally does not prevent res 
judicata from coming into effect.114 The element of fault enters 
the context of required joinder of claims not only through these 
exceptions, but oftentimes also in the judicial process of determin-
ing what is an "entire" cause of action or claim115 although one 
would think that it is even less a legitimate criterion here than 
it is for determining the scope of res judicata. It is certainly 
this flavor of repeated dogmatic inconsistency which makes 
Schopflocher so strongly advocate a distinction between res 
judicata preclusion and a special penalty preclusion. In this re-
spect, at least, he might be quite satisfied with the German law. 
The cases discussed, in which the German law-as exceptions-
requires a joinder of claims, are not based upon a common 
rationale. The only thing one can say is that they represent 
situations in which the legislature has recognized an exigency 
urgent enough to justify the requirement of joinder by providing 
an extraordinary preclusion beyond the limits of the procedural 
claim asserted and of res judicata. 
Experience had shown that especially in the course of patent 
controversies it frequently happened that economically less power-
ful defendants had to face a multiplicity of suits, consecutively 
instituted by economically more powerful plaintiffs on the ground 
of the same, allegedly wrongful, act or acts. Section 54 of the 
German Patentgesetz :was designed to remedy these situations, 
i.e., to prevent imposition upon the defendant of unnecessarily 
114 An attack on the means by which the judgment was obtained may only be made in 
a special equitable proceeding instituted for that very purpose, and there are strict require-
ments of relief. Cf. JUDGMENTS R:EsTATEMENT 256, 610 et seq. (1942). 
115 Cf. Schopflocher, note 112 supra, at p. 364. He speaks of "the necessity for the 
courts to strain and distort the concept of cause of action according to what in a given 
case is thought to be the desirable r~ult." 
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high expense of litigation, or the use by a more powerful plaintiff 
of the risk of such expense to make the less powerful defendant 
compliant.116 Under these circumstances and within this limited 
field a multiplicity of suits has been recognized as constituting 
a vexation of the defendant that is so unfair and has occurred 
frequently enough as to call for the legislature to step in. 
In the three other cases of compulsory joinder it is not the 
protection of the defendant which is the primary objective of 
the special preclusion. It is rather some particularly strong 
public interest involved that at times has made it desirable 
to cut down litigation as far as possible under a fair consideration. 
Thus, the harsh preclusion provided for by ZPO, section 616 in 
order to effect a joinder of all available divorce and cancellation 
claims, finds its rationale in a general favor matrimonii, a favor 
of marriage which has been amply voiced in other provisions of 
the German law as well. One of its procedurally most important 
emanations is the abhorrence of a multiplicity of marriage-de-
stroying suits.117 Quite a similar rationale underlies section 17 
Mieterschutzgesetz. The leases that come under the statute and, 
accordingly, are not subject to free termination on the side of 
the landlord, actually bring about some sort of long term relation, 
naturally depending upon reasonable cooperation from both 
sides. It is for this reason that the statute in the special interest 
of the public wants a judicial termination proceeding to be a 
concentration of all complaints which the landlord has against 
the tenant and which may be a basis for the judicial termination 
of the lease. Once the case has been tried and termination refused 
there shall be a "state of peace"118 between the parties; only with 
such claims as arise subsequently is the plaintiff allowed to 
come into court again. Likewise, the legislature has deemed it 
most undesirable that the executability of a judgment should be 
questioned again and again. Here, too, a public interest is involved, 
aside from the creditor's interest. The result has been the pro-
vision of ZPO, section 767 (3), requiring a joinder of claims. In 
none of the provisions, however, has the interest intended to be pro-
tected by the requirement of joinder been regarded as higher than 
116 Cf. BENKARD, KOMMENTAR ZUM PATENTGESETZ, 4th ed., §54, 1, p. 511 (1954); Ku.UER-
MOEI-IRING, KOMMENTAR ZUM P ATENTGESE'I'Z, 2d ed., §54, 1, p. 504 (1940). 
117 See Botticher, "Zur Lehre vom Streitgegenstand in Eheprozess," in FESTGABE FUER 
LEo ROSENBERG 85 (1949). 
118 See Roquette, "Rechtskraft und Ausschlusswirkung klagabweisender Urteile in 
Mietaufhebungsprozess," DR 1942, 874 at 875. 
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the ability of the plaintiff to comply with it. Exercise of due 
care exculpates him. This he may show in various ways. Proof 
to the effect that he did not and ought not to have had knowledge 
of a particular claim is probably the most important. There may, 
however, be some other reasonable considerations which justify 
the omission of a claim or claims even if the plaintiff does know 
of them. In view of the serious legislative intent expressed in 
said provisions, there has to be, of course, a strict measure for 
what is a reasonable consideration. 
Just as in the American law of compulsory joinder of claims, 
pendency may be pleaded in the above German cases when 
the plaintiff splits the claims required to be joined among several 
contemporaneous actions. In the German law, too, the require-
ment of joinder not only means that the plaintiff is precluded 
from maintaining successive actions, but also that he cannot bring 
several contemporaneous suits.119 This is as important a means 
of enforcing the joinder as the subsequently resulting preclusion. 
The scopes of res judicata and pendency are thus not quite ident-
ical in the German law. Pendency can be pleaded to the same 
extent that a subsequent preclusion would have, be ~t res 
judicata preclusion or special statutory preclusion or both. 
As intimated previously, the availability of the pendency plea 
makes the joinder required in a more literal sense of the word. 
The plaintiff, true, is not compelled to make more than one 
minimum claim the subject matter of litigation so as to obtain 
judicial action on the merits; if, however, he does so he has to do it 
in one proceeding, he must join, as a matter of proper commence-
ment of action. There are two other exceptions to the German rule 
that a joinder of claims is not required. They are not based on 
express statutory provisions requiring joinder, and involve no 
question of preclusion but one purely of proper commencement 
of action. 
One of the two situations has already been sketched.120 The 
defendant owes the plaintiff 500 marks. The plaintiff sues the 
defendant for 10 marks as part of the 500. There is evidence to 
the effect that the plaintiff has planned to bring fifty successive 
law suits against the defendant each for IO marks. This the Ger-
man law would not allow. Such a procedure on the part of the 
119 Cf. BENKARD, note 116 supra, §54, 6, p. 514, as to §54 Patentgesetz (not undebated); 
ROSENBERG, note 109 supra, §161, III 4, p. 741, and 104 RGZ 155 (1921), as to ZPO, §616; 
55 RGZ 101 (1903) as to ZPO, §767 (3). The same reasoning applies as to §17 Mieter-
schutzgesetz. 
120 P. 807 et seq. 
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plaintiff can only have the purpose of producing injury to the 
defendant. There are several ways of excluding such conduct. 
One may draw a procedural analogy to BGB, section 226 which 
prohibits the creditor from exercising a right for the sole purpose 
of causing injury to the debtor.121 Or one may say that the plain-
tiff has no conceivable legitimate interest in obtaining relief 
in such a way.122 Such an interest is a prerequisite for any judicial 
relief. Finally, such a procedure would be against the principle 
of good faith which not only governs the substantive law, but 
the law of procedure as well. Malevolent conduct of a case, and 
delay in particular, the law of procedure does not tolerate.123 In 
such a flagrant case of malevolent splitting, the German law would 
be prepared to presume an unbearable vexation of the defendant, 
the courts and the public. But still, in the absence of an explicit 
statutory command, it would shrink from precluding the plaintiff's 
claim for the remainder, i.e., the 490 marks, because this would 
clearly overstep the limits of res judicata.124 As opposed to the 
American law, neither res judicata nor any other concept of 
preclusion is called upon for the solution of this problem. Rather, 
the plaintiff's action would be dismissed without prejudice. The 
court would under such circumstances decline to pass upon its 
merits inasmuch as the plaintiff has not properly commenced his 
action. This in effect forces the plaintiff to join his claims at 
least to such an extent as to make the imputation of malice dis-
appear from the mind of the court. We know that as a general 
rule he does not have to join all of them. How much is necessary 
to remove the imputation of malice and vexation is wholly depend-
ent upon the circumstances of the individual case. None of the 
writers cited in notes 121 to 123 report any decision dealing with 
such a case. On the whole, the case seems to be of little practical 
importance. 
This certainly is different as to the second case pertinent to 
this context. It involves a splitting of claims among several suits 
for the purpose of circumventing the jurisdiction of the superior 
courts. The problem arises both in the German and the American 
law. In fact, as stated previously, the protection of the superior 
courts' jurisdiction has been one of the original reasons for the 
121 Cf. HELLWIG, SYSTEM DES DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS, Part I, p. 462 (1912). 
122 Cf. BAUMBACH-LAUTERBACH, 22d ed., KOMMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG, p. 247 
under E (1954). 
123 Cf. ROSENBERG, l.EHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS, 5th ed., §61 VII, p. 266 
(1951). 
124 Cf. ZPO, §322 (1). 
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Anglo-American doctrine of required joinder of claims, and still 
is an important feature of the rule.125 
Under the present German law126 the Amtsgerichte (small 
claims courts) have jurisdiction over ordinary claims up to the 
amount of 1,000 marks. Claims exceeding this amount come under 
the jurisdiction of the Landgerichte ( courts of general jurisdic-
tion). Let us suppose that the plaintiff has a claim against the 
defendant amounting to 2, I 00 marks and splits same among five 
suits contemporaneously instituted in the inferior Amtsgericht.127 
Let us further assume that the five part claims are individualized. 
This being so, the defendant, under the German law, cannot 
successfully plead pendency128 in any of the actions because, from 
a consideration of the prayers for relief in conjunction with the 
facts relied upon, it follows that the subject matter of each action 
is a different procedural claim, in the meaning of the term as 
described previously. But the Landgericht Berlin in its appellate 
decision cited in note 127 relied upon another ground to hold 
such a splitting inadmissible .. It concluded that this constituted 
an unfair attempt to circumvent the superior jurisdiction of the 
Landgericht to the defendant's detriment, and that the plaintiff 
himself had no legitimate interest in doing so which might out-
weigh the defendant's interest in having the case tried in the 
superior court. The court also expressly referred to the principle 
of good faith, to be complied with under the law of procedure 
too. This reasoning is closely connected with the German sequence 
of courts. Actions instituted in the Amtsgericht end ( on appeal) 
at the Landgericht. Furthermore, in the Amtsgericht the case 
is tried by a single judge whereas the Landgericht sits with three 
judges irrespective of whether it is acting in the first or appellate 
instance. And in cases instituted in the Landgericht the parties 
under some circumstances may have three instances: Landgericht, 
Oberlandesgericht (Court of Appeals), Bundesgerichtshof (Su-
preme Court).129 The Landgericht Berlin, in its decision referred 
to, recognized a possible interest of the plaintiff in bringing one 
part action in the inferior court because he may do this in order to 
125 Cf. Blume, "Required Joinder of Claims," 45 MICH. L. REv. 797 at 801-802 (1947). 
126 Section 23 (1) and §71, subsec. 1 of Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz. 
121 These were the facts underlying the decision of the Landgericht (District Court) 
of Berlin in JW 1931, p. 1766, which the case had reached on appeal. An additional fact 
was, to be sure, that the part claims were not sufficiently individualized. This also raised 
a problem of pendency which, however, we leave aside here. That the jurisdictional limit 
for the Amtsgerichte was 800 marks at that time is immaterial. 
128 The defendant actually had objected to the splitting on this ground. 
129 Formerly Reichsgericht. 
1957] REQUIRED ] OINDER OF CLAIMS 841 
save expenses in case he wins and the defendant thereafter pays 
the whole debt voluntarily.130 In the principal case, however, 
the court affirmed the judgment of the Amtsgericht dismissing 
all five actions for lack of jurisdiction. This is now universally 
held to be the correct view in a case of this kind.131 The effect 
of this view is directly to require the plaintiff to join his part 
claims in one action and to remove it to the superior court, in 
order to escape the dismissals. It must be noted, of course, that 
it is not meant to require a plaintiff always to join all parts of 
his claim which falls under the superior jurisdiction. But when-
ever he does bring several part actions, which in their aggregate 
exceed the limit of the inferior jurisdiction, he must join and 
remove them to the superior court, or else they will be dismissed. 
He may, according to the general German rule, institute one part 
action in the inferior court or in the superior court depending 
on where the part fits as a matter of jurisdiction. 
A very similar American case is that of Kruce v. Lakeside Bis-
cuit Co.132 The plaintiff brought eleven suits for money claims in 
the court of the justice of the peace. All claims asserted arose out 
of the same contract and within a certain period of time. Each 
claim severally fell under the J.P. court's jurisdiction; their total 
amount, however, was in excess thereof. The defendant objected 
on the ground of the rule against splitting and challenged the 
jurisdiction of the court. His objection was overruled by the 
justice of the peace and, on certiorari, by the circuit court. Upon 
writ of error the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed. It ap-
plied the doctrine against splitting an entire cause of action and 
held that the plaintiff was required to join all claims in one suit. 
Another case pertinent to this context is Sutcliffe Storage & Ware-
house Co. v. United States.133 The plaintiff brought four money 
actions against the United States in the United States district 
court. The claims were for the reasonable value of the use of 
certain premises over an alleged period of time. The plaintiff 
had leased other premises to the United States Navy, but con-
tended that the premises here in question had been used by the 
130 The ground rather than the amount of the claim may virtually be in issue. 
131 Cf., for example, ROSENBERG, note 123 supra, §31 II, I, p. 121; Goldschmidt, "Kann 
durch Zerlegung eines zur landgerichtlichen Zustandigkeit gehorigen Anspruchs in mehrere, 
gleichzeitig erhobene Teilklagen die amtsgerichtliche Zustandigkeit begriindet werden?" 
in JW 1931, p. 1753; BAUMBACH-LAUTERBACH, note 122, supra, p. 20 under 3; Landgericht 
Trier, JW 1926, p. 884, No. 22; Landgericht Koln, JW 1932 p. 2923, No. 6; Landgericht 
Hamburg, JW 1936, p. 960, No. 62. 
132 198 Mich. 736, 165 N.W. 609 (1917). 
183 (1st Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 849. 
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latter without being covered by said contract. Each of the claims 
severally was under 10,000 dollars; in their aggregate they ex-
ceeded that amount. The defendant United States objected to 
the splitting and relied upon the Tucker Act which provides 
that claims against the United States in excess of 10,000 dollars 
cannpt be brought in the United States district court, but must 
be instituted in the Court of Claims in Washington.134 On appeal 
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit sustained the defense, 
as had the district court. It based its reasoning on the principle 
that all claims arising from continuous trespass are required to 
be joined also in a case against the government. Accordingly, 
they were held to constitute one entire claim in the meaning of 
the doctrine against splitting and of the Tucker Act. The court 
pointed out that the plaintiff must make his choice whether he 
wishes to waive the amount exceeding 10,000 dollars, and remain 
in the district court, or to join all claims in one action and go 
to the Court of Claims. 
These two American cases make it obvious that the rule of 
required joinder of claims is also designed to protect the superior 
courts' jurisdiction. When the plaintiff must join his eleven or 
four claims, respectively, he cannot remain in the court of the 
justice of the peace or the United States district court. He has 
to remove to the circuit court in the first case, to the Court of 
Claims in the second, or else his action will be dismissed for want 
of jurisdiction. In the Sutcliffe case the court made express 
reference to the jurisdictional feature involved: "The congres-
sional policy is that all large claims must be presented in the 
one court in Washington." 
It thus appears that both laws largely concur in the case 
of contemporaneously commenced part actions for the purpose 
of circumventing the superior jurisdiction. They both prohibit 
such a splitting and directly require a joinder of actions and 
their removal to the superior court. But there is a considerable 
difference as to successive parf actions. Suppose the plaintiff 
sues for a part of his total claim in the inferior court and some 
time after final judgment on the merits sues for another part 
or the entire remainder. Under the American law of compulsory 
joinder his action must fail;135 under the German law it does not. 
According to the former the plaintiff, true, can go into the inferior 
court as long as he keeps the amount within the limits of its 
134 28 u.s.c. (1952) §1346. 
135 Provided, of course, that the previously discussed exceptions do not apply. 
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jurisdiction. But he has to pay dearly for doing so. In this situation 
the rule of compulsory joinder protects the jurisdiction of the 
superior court by indirection in that it will strike with its sharp 
weapon of subsequent preclusion. The plaintiff will fail at the 
broad bar of res judicata.136 The German law of res judicata 
cannot accomplish this, as we have seen, because the prayer for 
relief, individualizing the procedural claim, marks out its limits 
definitely. And here the German law has not taken the other 
conceivable step, i.e., to establish a procedural bar by way of 
special preclusion. Here again, the idea of the negative declaratory 
action and relief plays an important role. When the plaintiff 
brings consecutive (individualized) part actions in a case where 
the total claim would come under the jurisdiction of the superior 
court, the defendant, who has an interest in doing so, may file 
a counterclaim praying for a judicial declaration that the whole 
claim does not exist.137 Thereby the whole claim becomes pending, 
and the defendant can ask the inferior court for removal of the 
entire case to the superior court.138 In the case of contemporaneous 
(individualized) part actions which, added together, amount to 
the total claim, the defendant cannot avail himself of this pos-
sibility because his counterclaim for negative declaratory relief 
would be successfully objected to by a plea of pendency, the 
subject matter of the declaratory counterclaim being included in 
the actions for coercive relief. Accordingly, the defendant would, 
in this situation and only in this,. stand defenseless before the 
plaintiff's unconscionable· resort to the inferior jurisdiction.139 
If the defendant in the case of one part action does not make use 
of the negative declaratory counteraction the law does not step in 
on its own initiative by way of subsequent preclusion. The superior 
court's jurisdiction not being an exclusive one the defendant will 
be protected only if he insists on same. One thus has the im-
pression that the German law, when it prohibits splitting of a 
total claim among several contemporaneous actions, does so pri-
marily for the sake of the defendant's statutory right to invoke 
the superior jurisdiction. On the other hand, one may be inclined 
to think that the Anglo-American rule of required joinder of 
186 Cf. JUDGMENTS RE5TATEMENT 253, 254 (1942). 
137 It is the prevailing view that he can do this although part of the disputed claim has 
been pending already. Cf. BAUMBACH-LAUTERBACH, note 122 supra, §280 2 D, p. 496, STEIN-
JoNAS-SCHOENKE, KOMMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS, 17th ed., §280 ll 2; Goldschmidt, 
note 131 supra, at p. 1754; all writers have cited ample cases. 
138 ZPO, §506. 
139 Cf. Goldschmidt, note 131 supra. 
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claims, so far as its jurisdictional features are concerned, protects 
the superior courts' jurisdiction for it own sake. This, to be 
sure, is hard to decide because the jurisdictional features seem 
to be almost inextricably interwoven with the other rationales 
of the rule, i.e., protection of the defendant against a multiplicity 
of suits as such and saving the time of the courts in general. 
[To be concluded.] 
